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ABSTRACT 
This research paper provides an address and analysis of the challenges commonly faced under 
Chinese investments in Africa and seeks to address the question on what regulatory mechanism 
can be used to maximise the benefits of Chinese Investments in Africa. In doing so, this study 
seeks to clarify the nature activities that transpire under Chinese investment, this is because over 
the past decades there have been serious accusations of human rights violations, illegal 
practices and lack of technology and skills transfers amongst many other problems. In 
conducting this examination, this study, I consider the dynamic legal and policy framework that 
regulates the Chinese investments. This provides a vehicle through which the legality of Chinese 
investments actors can be tested.  
Secondly, an outline and discussion of two selected challenges namely, Labour relations and 
employment practices; lack of skill and technology transfers. These issues are analysed in depth 
from different perspectives and potential solutions will be provided. In addressing the 
challenges, I draw from the experience of South Africa in terms of employment practices and 
Huawei in Zimbabwe and South Africa case studies. 
The research ultimately concludes that the challenges faced under Chinese investments are not 
as described by critics but rather they are complex and differ from business to business. 
Therefore, the best solution may be to ensure effective enforcement and implementation of local 
laws to ensure compliance with the law. The study recommends that there is a need for Africa to 
have a uniform China policy and to take advantage of the FOCAC process to prioritise the areas 
critical to their national and continental development goals. 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
TRIMs   Trade-Related Investment Measures 
TRIPs    Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights 
 BITs    Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 SADC FIP Southern African Development Community Protocol on Finance and Investment  
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 Background to the study 
 
Chinese investments in Africa have grown rapidly in recent years.1 This has contributed 
immensely to the development of infrastructure on the African continent which is still largely 
undeveloped.2 The areas lacking developments encompass different important economic sectors 
such as utilities, telecommunications, port construction and transportation.3 Hence, foreign 
investment is extremely needed in Africa.4 This is because, while Africa has the fastest-growing 
population it receives the least Foreign Direct Investment (hereafter ‘FDI') in the world.5 
Furthermore, while China's investments in Africa are growing, most of Africa's investment inflow 
still comes from traditional investors like the United States, Europe and Japan.6 7 
 
The relationship between Africa and China dates back to ancient times when the Chinese 
navigator Zheng He, visited the shores of East Africa.8 In recent history, the Chinese built 
Tanzania-Zambia railway stands as a great symbol of what China and Africa can achieve through 
working together.9 Under their friendship, in 2000 the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
(FOCAC) was established, providing a platform and multilateral mechanism to conduct collective 
consultations and practical  
 
1
 Wenjie Chen, David Dollar & Heiwai Tang ‘Why Is China Investing in Africa? Evidence 
from the Firm Level’ (2018) 32 The World Bank Economic Review 32 
https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/lhw049 at 610. 
2
 J.B. Maverick ‘The 3 Reasons Why Chinese Invest in Africa’ available at   
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/081315/3-reasons-why-chinese-invest-africa.asp  accessed 
on 29 August 2019.  
3
 Ibid.  
4
 Alicia Garcia-Herreror and Jianwei Xu ‘China's investment in Africa: What the data says, and the 
implications for Europe’ available at https://bruegel.org/2019/07/chinas-investment-in-africa-what-the-data-
really-says-and-the-implications-for-europe/ accessed on 29 August 2019. 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Ibid.  
7
 Catherine Elkemann & Oliver C. Ruppel ‘Chinese Foreign Direct Investment into 
Africa in the Context of BRICS and Sino-African Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2015) 13 Rich. 
J. Global L. & Bus at 593. 
8
 Yi Fan ‘True story of China-Africa Cooperation’ available at 






cooperation.10 Africa-China cooperation is guided by distinct principles which emphasise 
on strategic partnership, mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty and political non-interference.11 
This relationship is regulated by different strategies, documents, policies and initiatives. The 
Chinese side is regulated by Outbound Foreign Investment regulations and policies. This includes 
initiatives such as ‘China 2025 (Made in China)’ and the One Belt One Road Initiative. On the 
other hand, the African side is regulated by the individual country's investment legislation. There 
is no single document detailing a China strategy. Collectively, the FOCAC body stands as the main 
body that manages the relationship between China and Africa. 
 
There is a nexus between the increase of Chinese investments in Africa and the ‘Going-
Out’ policy which sought to use China’s large trillion American dollar reserves to help Chinese 
companies become global firms.12 This expansion allowed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) such 
as CNPC, Sinopec, CNOOC and Chinalco, to acquire foreign technologies and natural resources.13 
It is, therefore, important before describing the complex nature of Chinese investments in Africa, 
to describe the nature of the Chinese companies that are investing in Africa. 
 
Originally, Chinese SOEs entered into joint ventures with other African state-owned 
counterparts.14 However, Chinese private companies have also joined in and its participation has 
phenomenally increased by 50 per cent per year.15 These two types of entities co-exist and operate 
at different scales, the SOEs are under pressure to operate solely on a commercial basis.16 Since 
they are state-owned and elements of State control are present. This distinction is important since 
local companies are likely to be disadvantaged when it comes to the procurement of contracts 
whereby SOEs are automatically granted contracts without due process by the host state.  It is 
equally important to describe the nature of Chinese investments in Africa.  As they have been 
constantly criticised for their lack of transparency, corruption and human rights abuses. 
 
10
 Zeng Aiping & Shu Zhan ‘Origin, Achievements, and the Prospects of the Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation’ (2018)72 China Int'l Stud at 88.   
11
  Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi ‘The Rise of China and India in Africa’ (2010) 61.   
12
 Joseph Onjala ‘Chinese Direct Investments in Africa: Motivations and Environmental 
Implications’ Georgetown Journal of International Affairs vol. 17 no. 1(2016) 91.  
13
  Ben Yunmo Wang ‘China ‘Going Out’ 2.0: Dawn of a New Era for Chinese Investment 
Abroad’ available at https://www.huffpost.com/entry/china-going-out-20-dawn-
o_b_7046790?guccounter=1 accessed on 29 August 2019.  
14
 Joseph Onjala op cit note 12. 
15
 Ibid.  
16




Furthermore, lack of diversity as they are primarily concentrated in the mining and construction 
sectors.17 
  
These investments are complex, Antonio Martuscelli submits that they are commonly 
backed up by government bilateral agreements in a package that bundles aid and financial support, 
investments, access to natural resources and trade facilitation.18 China has also extensively used 
the concept of infrastructure-for-resources loans to finance mostly infrastructure projects in several 
resource-rich countries such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan.19 This has drawn lots of criticism from 
the media and some commentators. 
 
While China is Africa’s biggest investor in infrastructure projects. There has been a lot of 
criticism towards Chinese investments in Africa, some issues are mere propaganda, and some are 
genuine concerns. These issues include labour and environmental violations by Chinese owned 
businesses and inhumane working conditions.20 Secondly, not employing local managers and only 
using locals for low paying jobs including lack skills development and technology transfer.21 
Thirdly, China excessively increasing Africa’s debt by giving loans to countries that cannot pay it 
back, in order to have political control over African natural resources.    
 
In any commercial relationship, there are advantages and disadvantages. The relationship 
between Africa and China is not an exception. Therefore, central to this research is the assessment 
of Africa's prospects and challenges in connection with Chinese investments. It will further 
investigate the direct and indirect impact of these investments on labour relations, skills 
development and technology transfer concerns. While assessing its contribution towards Africa’s 
Agenda 2063. The Agenda 2063: Africa We Want initiative, is ‘Africa’s blueprint and master plan 
for transforming Africa into the global powerhouse of the future.’22It contains Africa’s aspirations 
such as, for the purpose of this study ‘A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and 
Sustainable Development’ and goals like ‘Environmentally sustainable and climate-resilient 
 
17
 Antonio Martuscelli ‘The Economics of China's Engagement with Africa: What is the Empirical 
Evidence?’ Dev Policy Rev (2019) DOI:10.1111/dpr.12456 at 13. 
18
 Ibid at 14.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
  Irene Yuan Sun, Kartik Jayaram & Omid Kassiri ‘Dance of the Lions and Dragons: How are Africa 
and China engaging, and how Will the Partnership Evolve?’ (2017) 17.  
21
 Ibid.    
22
 ‘Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want’ available at  https://au.int/agenda2063/sdgs accessed on 23 




economies and communities.’23 There is also a push to have Africa take the responsibility of 
financing her own development.24 This point is critical since, a realisation of thereof, would result 
in a more powerful Africa on the world arena. Another important goal is the drive to have an 
educated Africa citizenry underpinned by Science, Technology and Innovation.25 The significance 
of this goal is in its potential impact on making Africa an important investment destination. 
Thereby, resulting in a skilled labour force that will allow for fast-tracked and effective skills and 
technological transfer in the area of human resources development. The document also includes 
Priority Areas such as jobs, poverty, economic diversification and resilience, Sustainable and 
inclusive economic growth amongst other things.26  
 
Chinese investment in Africa area is relatively new, and literature on the legal aspects of it 
is thin.27 This area has not been researched as studies seem to have dealt with these investments 
from an economic or international relations perspective.  The interconnection between Chinese 
Investments in Africa and Agenda 2063 has received insufficient attention in research. 
 
In the light of above factors, this research sets out to examine the impact of Chinese 
investments on sustainable development and how Africa can work on reducing the risks of these 
investments in order to fulfil the goals pledged in the agenda 2063 including the national 
development goals of its respective countries. This research will draw from the experiences of 
Chinese investment projects in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region. 
These factors will be analysed by considering the legal culture in China and that of the hosting 















  Margaret McMillan ‘Chinese Investment in Africa’ available at https://www.theigc.org/blog/chinese-




1.2 Statements of the Research Problem 
The problem this research seeks to address is how African States can better regulate the 
impact of Chinese investments in order to reach the goals of Agenda 2063 on human resources 
development. The Africa-China commercial relationship has found itself in a complicated position. 
It has been under scrutiny from powerful media houses and other commentators. Also, the ongoing 
trade war between the United States of America and China could potentially have an impact, both 
positive and negative on the African continent.28This puts Africa in a rather complex position since 
it might have to choose sides or allies depending on how Africa leverages this event, it could have 
an impact on Chinese investments as a whole. Therefore, it is important to assess the challenges 
and prospects of Chinese investments in Africa. This allows the African side to make the best of 
the Africa-China relationship by developing a multilateral cohesive framework in order to make it 
truly win-win cooperation with mutual benefits. 
 
The relationship between Africa and China is of great importance especially in this 
globalisation era, as it brings about enormous economic benefits to the whole continent and the 
hosting African country. These economic benefits are advantageous to the world at large since it 
reduces the influx of African migrants to Europe and the United States and contributes positively 
to international security through poverty reduction and employment creation. However, despite 
these positive contributions, African domestic industries, in the past, such as textile has notably 
suffered due to competition from the Chinese companies in Africa. In South Africa for example, 
the burden was carried by local factories that faced closure which increased unemployment rates, 
with garment industry jobs falling from 220,000 in 2002 to 100,000 in 2011.29  
 
While not directly caused by Chinese companies’ operations, recently Southern Africa was 
hit by Cyclones Idai and Kenneth, damaging cities, killing hundreds of people while displacing 
millions in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and some parts of South Africa.30  It becomes a point 
of paramount significance for the SADC region and the African States to protect its national 
industries and environment where there are negative impacts of Chinese investments. This is done 
 
28
 Mehari Teddele Maru ‘A new cold war in Africa’ https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/cold-
war-africa-190630102044847.html accessed on 29 August 2019.  
29
 Tansy Hoskins ‘Ethical fashion: saving South Africa’s clothing industry’ available at  
https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/sustainable-fashion-blog/2015/feb/02/ethical-fashion-
rebuild-south-africa-garment-industry accessed on 30 August 2019.   
30
 See, ‘Cyclones Idai and Kenneth’ available at https://www.unocha.org/southern-and-eastern-africa-




to ensure sustainable development. The African States are faced with a mammoth task of finding 
solutions to these challenges which ranges from labour, environmental, technological and skills 
transfer concerns, as they are needed to increase economic benefits. Furthermore, it ensures the 
growth of local industries, national economies and the African economy. The focus should, 
however, not only be on the negative aspects of these investments. There should be a strong focus 
of the positive aspects from thereof, this allows Africa and China to improve on, and maintain 
these successes.     
 
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives 
 
This research aims to investigate which legal and policy framework African countries can 
put in place to regulate the impacts of Chinese investments in their respective countries in order to 
maximise economic benefits through sustainable development. Therefore, meeting national 
development goals of the respective African States and ensuring the continent meets the goals of 
Agenda 2063. The research will also make recommendations on how African countries can address 
identified challenges impacts of Chinese investments therefore, ensuring mutual benefit of win-

















1.4 Research Questions 
The main research question is ‘How best can the African States maximise economic 
benefits and manage the impact of Chinese Investments in Africa?’  
 
These two key sub-questions that are also important in finding the answer. 
I. What mechanisms, if any, has the African States put in place in trying to 
minimise the risk involved with Chinese investments in Africa, including at a National, 
Regional and Continental level? 
  
II. II. What are the challenges encountered under Chinese Investments in 
African in addressing development goals in SADC?  
 
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
To answer the above research questions, I will analyse relevant and related literature on 
Chinese Investments in Africa. The research is a desktop-based project. It will make use of primary 
resources of law that includes Investment legislation from China and the host African State, SADC 
and Africa Union documents and FOCAC Action plans. Secondary resources of law will include 
journal articles, documents, electronic resources and databases, books written by experts, reports, 
online newspaper articles, working papers and organisations within the field of study. The research 
will give an in-depth analysis of the prospects and challenges faced by the African side in different 
projects, while critically assessing the legal background and cultures of the investing Chinese 
entity and the African counterpart. This will give a factual understanding of the challenges that 
African countries face as a result of the Chinese investments. This research will also use current 
news and developments in the area of study.  
 
This research will use a qualitative descriptive approach. The primary concern of this 




culture and narrative.31 To obtain a broader understanding of the legal aspects of the challenges 
and successes facing investments in Africa, a comparative study will be applied.  This comparison 
is limited to the United Kingdom since it has colonial ties with most countries in the SADC region.  
 
In terms of the law, this research includes multi-disciplines, mainly Investment law and 
Labour law.  Furthermore, this research study will be positioned within the theoretical framework 
of development and policy theory. Key theoretical principles include social, institutional, 
economic and political factors affect African people’s position in the global society. The 
development theory is appropriate to this study since it involves institutional and social-economic 
transformation.32 Chinese investments in Africa have the potential to positively impact Africa’s 
economic growth through increased urbanization, industrialization and increased and appropriate 
use of technology in all sectors of the economy.33  
1.6 Significance of the study  
 
This paper will provide a useful evaluation to the SADC secretariat and countries on 
whether a regional investment regulatory framework is a viable means of dealing with issues of 
sustainable development in SADC. These issues deal with fair labour practices and skills and 
technological transfers in the region. Furthermore, the study will consider the frameworks for 
regulating Chinese Investments within SADC. Secondly, what lessons can be taken from the 
region’s experience for developing a sound investment and legal framework regulating Chinese 
Investments. Thirdly, the role of RECs in the engagement between China and Africa will be 
evaluated.   In addition, the study will contribute towards the existing literature on the prospective 
benefits and challenges of developing a legally binding regional investment regulatory framework 
in SADC.  
 
Foreign investments, in general, play a key role in the economic development of Africa 
countries. This research paper focuses on Chinese investments in Africa because it is growing fast 
and therefore should be able to contribute to the discussion and debate on the contents of the 
 
31
 Qualitative Methods for Law and Society Research—An EUI Research Guide available at 
https://www.eui.eu/Documents/Research/Library/ResearchGuides/Law/EUI-Law-and-Society-Qualitative-
Methods-Reading-List-April-15.pdf accessed on  25 September 2019 
32
 Akampurira Abraham ‘Development Theory, Policy and Planning’(published Diploma thesis, Munich 






investments. Consequently, this paper will be useful to law students, policymakers, practitioners, 
advisors and consultants operating in the area of Chinese investments in Africa.  
 
1.7 Preview of Chapters 
This research paper comprises four chapters 
1.7.1 Chapter One:  
Chapter one provides an introduction and background to this research. Furthermore, it 
contextualises the nature of the research to the extent that it identifies the problem and outlines the 
methodology and approach used. 
1.7.2 Chapter Two: 
Chapter two provides in general terms a conceptual and theoretical framework for this 
paper, by discussing a brief history of China's relationship and economic engagement with Africa. 
It will discuss the nature of Chinese investments in Africa and the parties involved. In particular, 
it will focus on the advantages and disadvantages of these investments within the context of 
globalisation and regionalism.  
1.7.3 Chapter Three: 
This chapter will give an overview of the challenges and prospects of Chinese Investments 
faced by African countries; this will be discussed in the SADC context. The chapter will discuss 
the challenges faced by SADC countries, concerning labour and technological skills transfers in 
the context of suitable development. The Chapter will also include case studies of Huawei’s 
operations in South Africa and Zimbabwe in an attempt to contextualise skills development and 
technology transfers.  
1.7.5 Chapter Four: 
 
Lastly, chapter five concludes the research and makes recommendations that the Africa 
States should consider when negotiating and managing Chinese investments. Including, when they 









LITERATURE REVIEW AND LEGAL-POLICY FRAMEWORK OF CHINESE 
INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA. 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
It is widely agreed that Chinese Investments in Africa contributes significantly to African 
development.34 Inevitably, this growing economic relationship requires adequate legal and policy 
mechanisms in order to make it feasible and beneficial on a long-term basis.  As such, an in-depth 
understanding of the characteristics and elements of Chinese investments is necessary.  
 
This chapter discusses the current literature and frameworks for Chinese investments in 
Africa.  First, this chapter begins by providing a review of literature that already exists in relation 
to labour practices, and skills and technological transfers.  Secondly, it provides the definitions 
and scope of foreign investments, in addition, it lays down theories of foreign investments.  
Thirdly, it provides a brief overview of Chinese investments in Africa.  Fourthly, it outlines the 
different legal and policies that regulate Chinese investments in Africa and finally, it discusses the 
role of Africa-China multilateral bodies. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 
Africa-China’s economic engagement is increasingly being academically researched.35 
There are many scholars, commentators and spectators from Africa, China and West offering 
different and diverse perspectives. Perhaps, more interestingly, several books and journal articles 
and even some major media houses have recorded a change in attitude towards Chinese 
investments on the African continent. This systematic literature review will show the findings 
which have been made with regards to certain core aspects of Chinese investments in Africa; in 
particular, problems concerning labour practices and, skills and technology transfer.  
 
34
 Yuan Sun ‘ China’s Changing approach to Africa’ available at 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/02/04/chinas-changing-approach-to-
africa/ accessed on  20 January  2020. 
35
 Clever Mapure ‘Chinese Investments in Zimbabwe and Namibia: A Comparative Legal Analysis’ 




Over the years Chinese companies’ operations have been severely criticised in the media. 
Headlines such as reported in the Guardian newspaper describes a rather scary picture of the 
Chinese behaviour in most African countries.36 The report included accusations by workers who 
allegedly claimed to have suffered ‘regular beatings and miserable pay and conditions. This 
manifestly makes it illegal in any civilised society and under international law. These concerns are 
mostly reported in the period between 2006 and 2012. This is the period in which the Chinese 
investment started increasing in Africa. Yaw and Jauch in a book title ‘Chinese investments in 
Africa: A labour Perspective’ offers a comprehensive field study on the labour aspects in ten 
African countries mostly in Southern Africa. This book highlighted similarities to the accusations 
in the media, however, it also showed that Chinese companies have different behaviours and 
management styles. Tang Xiaoyan (2016)37 in examining the benefits accrued by Africans from 
Chinese employment. Studied experiences in Angola, Ethiopia, Zambia and Egypt. Therefore, 
covering different experiences across environments with different economic conditions, political 
and legal cultures. He studied the nature of Chinese employment practices by evaluating Low 
wages, poor conditions, and lack of training.  
 
He dismissed the criticism of employment practices by Chinese companies employing their 
own workers to work on projects in Africa as not being supported by data.38 In some instances, for 
example in Angola reports showed that the Chinese workers made up 59.7 per cent. The 
explanation offered for this is that there were pressing deadlines and lack of local skilled labour in 
post-war Angola. In addition to that, the results showed that Chinese workers cost double the 
amount of employing Africans since they also provided additional costs, such as food, trips home 
and accommodation. Lastly, the companies emphasised that they required experienced Chinese 
workers in order to get the project up and running quickly since the workers already know how 
the systems and the Chinese business model. This justification is however inadequate as it assumes 
Africans are inexperienced workers with no capacity whatsoever as to their default position.   
In response to the critics of low wages, based on interviews conducted in Ethiopia, mostly 
in manufacturing sectors. The author showed that people earned different salaries at different 
 
36 David Smith ‘Workers claim abuse as China adds Zimbabwe to its scramble for Africa’ available at  
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/02/china-zimbabwe-workers-abuse accessed on 20 January 2020. 
37
 Tang Xiaoyang ‘Does Chinese Employment Benefit Africans? Investigating Chinese Enterprises and 
their Operations in Africa’ African Studies Quarterly’ (2016) 16 available 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v16/v16i3-4a8.pdf at 107. 
38




levels, such as 600 dollars to floor managers, 40 dollars to assembly lines, and 100 dollars to 
technicians. The author did not link it to any minimum wage or living standards of Ethiopian 
society.39 China's work ethic as influenced by its own history, cannot be used to justify low wages. 
Many texts recorded Chinese managers making comments such as 'Chinese were also poor thirty 
years ago and it took time and hard work to become successful.’40   
 
It is not surprising that some African workers never return after the first payment.  African 
perspective, will remain negative, should such practise persist.  Using low wages in order to see a 
return to an investment without offering shares to the workers cannot be justified. Host countries 
should set minimum standards of employment.  The Author, in his approach, focuses on Chinese 
cultural aspects without doing research on the African employment culture.    
The author argues that problems of working conditions are partly related to the issue of 
labour costs. Companies attempt to save labour costs by reducing expenditures on health care and 
other facilities. The author suggests that this cannot be since as exploitation or cruel treatment of 
African workers since the Chinese workers are also under the same conditions. This reasoning is 
socially and legally improper. Inhumane treatment in a workplace cannot be justified even in 
pursuant to the reduction of labour costs. Furthermore, the relationship between the Chinese 
company in Africa and all its workers, African or Chinese should be regulated by the host country's 
labour laws. 
  
 Lastly, the author discovered that most Chinese companies make use of onsite training.  
Some companies send a small group of workers to get training in China. However, the impact of 
this is not always beneficial since some African workers prefer to change their jobs after having 
acquired skills.  Commonly so, many companies lack financial mobility or ability to retain skilled 
workers. Factors such as language barrier also contribute towards impediments to effective 
learning, this can be equated skills and to a lesser extent technological transfer.   
 
Clever Mapure in a comparative legal analysis of Chinese investments in Zimbabwe and 
Namibia 41. Examined the extent to which Chinese companies comply with the host African law 
and the extent to which African governments enforce their laws.  This research focused on whether 
 
39








China is really a violator of the law or does the problem lie the African governments and the laws 
and policies in Africa? In doing so, the research looks at labour activities and skills and 
technological transfers in both countries.  
 
This research noted that Zimbabwe like many other African countries have comprehensive 
laws to deal with the performance requirements of foreign investors. However, African countries 
lack institutional and implementation capacity to enforce those laws. For example, Chakanya and 
Muchichwa, after field observation in the country alluded that Chinese companies ‘appear to have 
their own workplace rules which they follow.'  In an attempt to find justification for this behaviour, 
well-respected scholar Brautigam, argued malpractice partially to China’s historic lack of domestic 
and labour regulations. This view is correct in that, there appears to be no political will to enforce 
these laws. This could be partially attributed to the scarcity of FDI in Africa. Perhaps, African 
governments fear that the companies risk exiting the country should they strictly enforce the law. 
   
The characterisation of Africa-China relations is filled with romanticised rhetoric of 
friendship. The African side appears stuck on political consideration when dealing with China, 
while its counterpart is now operating purely on a commercial basis. It is evidently clear that there 
is a lack of strict and systemic enforcement of African laws. The same applies to Namibia, he 
found that Chinese companies seemingly do not have to adhere to some legal provisions due to 
political favouritism. As Clever Mapure concluded ‘What is necessary is to effectively enforce 
these laws and avoid unnecessary existence of the blame syndrome about Chinese investments in 
Africa’. This is important for the purpose of research since the objective is to find solutions to 
Africa’s china problem. 
 
There have also been accusations of lack of skills and technology transfer. In Namibia, 
Mapura discovered that there is no legal obligation requiring investors to ensure skills transfers, it 
is left to business negotiations. There is a significant gap in African law in so far as technology 
transfer is concerned.  This paper will investigate ways that Africans state can acquire skills and 
technology through Chinese investments in Africa. 
 
Caution must be advised, though; both Tang Xiaoyan (2016) and Clever Mapura (2014) 
were based on mixed methodology including comprising of field interviews, data from government 




of research did not set a criterion that the Chinese use to employ workers in Africa and from China. 
There is a gap in that regard and further research is needed. While Clever Mapura (2016)'s research 
is library-based, the approach of testing case studies against the law and studying Chinese 
investments in Africa from a legal perspective is important. It is the approach that will be utilised 
by this research.       
 
 To sum up, there are different arguments and justifications offered for the various practices 
of Chinese businesses in Africa. Despite a growing body of literature on Chinese investments, 
currently, findings suggest, to the best of our knowledge there is a gap in relation to the 
effectiveness of law in the Africa-China relation. In addition to that, a more in-depth study is 
required to understand the impact of Chinese investment on the development in Africa. This 
research aims to fill the gap by studying the behaviour of Chinese companies and in relation to the 























2.3 THE SCOPE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT  
 
There is no uniform and standard definition of foreign investment. According to 
Sornarajah, Foreign investment involves ‘the transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one 
country to another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under the total or 
partial control of the owner of the assets.’42 He submitted that foreign direct investment ‘FDI’ is 
constituted in situations where there is a transfer, purchase or construction of physical property 
such as equipment, manufacturing plans or equipment.43   
 
The International Monetary Fund ‘IMF’ defines FDI as a “cross border investment” in 
which an investor that is “resident in one economy [has] control or a significant degree of influence 
on the management of an enterprise that is resident in another economy.” 44      
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) Development 
Assistance Committee, also provides a standardised definition of FDI the OECD Benchmark 
Definition:  
‘Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a category of investment that reflects the 
objective of establishing a lasting interest by a resident enterprise in one economy 
(direct investor) with an enterprise (direct investment enterprise) that is resident in an 
economy other than that of the direct investor. The lasting interest implies the existence 
of a long-term relationship between the direct investor and the direct investment 
enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. 
The direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting power of an enterprise 
resident in one economy by an investor resident in another economy is evidence of 
such a relationship’.45 
This definition, while only agreed by OECD members, has been adopted by major 
international institutions dealing with trade and investments.46 This research will use the OECD 
definition when referring to FDI. 
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The category of foreign investment considered in this paper is FDI.  It is therefore important 
to distinguish it from portfolio management.47 Somarajah alludes that portfolio investment 
involves the ‘movement of money for the purpose of buying shares in a company formed or 
functioning in another country.’48 He further submits that what specifically distinguishes it is that 
in portfolio investment, there is a separation between management and control of the company, 
conversely the share of ownership in it.49  
According to the IMF, the direct investor’s managerial role distinguishes FDI, which is an 
active form of investment, from portfolio investment, which is a passive form.50 This is because 
FDI by its nature is established on a long-term basis, it is, therefore, natural for the investor to 
control the management and the company.  
Lastly, Sornarajah concludes that the nature of foreign investment is defined in investment 
treaties. Therefore, definitions differ according to the purpose for which they envisioned.51  
  
2.3.1 Theories on Foreign Investment  
 
There are different conflicting theories that legally shaped the attitudes towards foreign 
investment. These theories are mainly concerned with the economic development of developing 
countries.52 One theory argues that foreign investment is wholly beneficial to the hosting state and, 
conversely the other theory maintains that the dependence of foreign investment suppresses 
development.53 A reality of this conflict can be found in Chinese investments in Africa, questions 
are raised on whether African countries are benefiting from economic engagement. And also, cases 
of countries that are now depended on Chinese investments.  These theories, therefore, offers a 




 Under international law only FDI is subject to the protection of customary international law, but 
portfolio investment is not.  See Sornarajah op cit 42 at 9.  
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2.3.2 The classical theory on foreign investment  
According to the classical theory of foreign investment, foreign investment is entirely 
beneficial to the host country’s economy.54 The reasons given for this position is that the capital 
brought into the host country increases the availability of capital which can be diverted to other 
essential sectors of the economy.55 An example of this is the ‘Angola model’.56 Furthermore, the 
foreign investor brings new technology, jobs, management and advanced marketing skills to the 
host country’s economy and workforce.57 Sornarajah submitted that the theory has limitations 
since it fails to answer why despite increasing foreign investments, there is still no economic 
development and resource-rich countries remain poor.58 This is especially relevant to Africa, a 
continent endowed with natural resources but is still poor.  This theory is, however, widely 
accepted. 
The theory is not without limitations, as the reasons advanced to back this theory can be 
criticised for their shortcomings. For example, Sornarajah explains that the new technology 
brought in by the new investor is sometimes obsolete.59 In this case, the possibility of harmfulness 
outweighs the economic benefits more so to the environment of the host country.  In addition to 
that, the belief that multinational corporations integrate their operations through various activities 
brings about employment benefits, this is not always the case, especially if the motivating factors 
are simply to exploit natural resources and cheaper labour.60 This theory resulted in economies 
reducing the regulatory market mechanism. While this supposedly attracts foreign investment in 
limits the host state's control over the investment. This theory will be important for assessing the 
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2.3.3 The dependency theory  
 
The dependency theory is opposed to the classical theory, it is of the view that foreign 
investment will not bring about meaningful economic development.61 This was as a result of 
Multinational Corporation serving only the interests of developed countries instead of substantially 
benefiting the host country.62  In addition to that, it seemed as only benefiting the political elites 
who collaborated with the foreign investor to overcome legal regulations such as those promoting 
human rights, indigenisation measures, amongst other things.63 Perhaps, this view is prominent 
amongst many Africa-China commentators and observers. For example, in South Africa, they have 
an affirmative action called the Black Economic empowerment which seeks to redress the 
injustices of its apartheid past.64 And many beneficiaries of this program, are potentially elites who 
sometimes serve as Black Economic Empowerment ‘BEE’ for hire. And in Zimbabwe, the 
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act65 which required that every business should have 
51 percent ownership of black Zimbabweans was also weakened through systematic manoeuvring 
by multinational corporations and host government elites, therefore rendering its purpose, less 
beneficial to the public.  Sornarajah concludes that the dependency theory symbolises a mechanism 
in which local interests can be protected as it sought to integrate noneconomic factors such as 
human rights, labour rights and the environment.66 For the purpose of this paper, it will provide a 
lens through which we can assess the impact of Chinese investments in Africa from a general 
societal perspective rather than a general economic overview.   
 
2.3.4 The middle path 
The hostility towards multinational corporations evidenced by the dependence theory has 
largely dwindled because of balanced research of the positive-negative impact of foreign 
investment on an economy.67 Particularly, the studies of the United Nations Commission on 
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Transnational Corporations (UNCTC) showed that despite the potential harm, properly harnessed 
multinational corporations could fast track the growth of developing countries economy.68  The 
implications that the Africa-China face is that, the investment partner is sometimes a State-Owned 
Enterprise (SOE) which is a government-controlled. There cannot be a separation thereof on the 
governments' policy and that of the SOE.  However, host countries should ensure that they regulate 
foreign investment in order to maximise full investment benefits and protection to the investor. 
 
2.4 AN OVERVIEW OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA  
 
Generally, Foreign investment is an interesting, broad and dynamic area which requires a 
thorough study. However, such a study, while beneficial to the Africa-China economic relationship 
would go beyond the scope of this current study. This paper, therefore, focuses exclusively on 
Chinese Investments in Africa. In particular, this refers to Chinese Outward direct investment into 
Africa. It should be noted that under this relationship several African countries and businesses are 
investing in China. 
 
‘The transition of the global economy from an industrial focus to one based on knowledge 
and information presents numerous opportunities and challenges to many countries, especially 
those in the developing world’.69 Chinese investment has immensely contributed to these 
possibilities, ever since adopting the policy of made in China 2025.70  This policy involves China 
moving from being a labour driven economy to a knowledge-based economy in its efforts to 
become a ‘moderately prosperous society. For example, in the manufacturing sector, Chinese 
companies are offshoring millions of jobs to different regions and Africa is set to greatly benefit 
from this process.71 
The sectors of these investments are also important because they require different labour 
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2.4.1 The nature of China’s investments in Africa  
 
Chinese investments have grown enormously over the past two decades, that is between 
2000 to present day. In 2018, at the FOCAC meeting in Beijing President Xi Jinping pledged 60 
billion USD.72 Signalling a forever growing commitment towards financing development in 
Africa.  As briefly discussed in the previous chapter, the nature of Chinese investments are very 
complex and often misunderstood as a result of a lack of transparency or the accessibility of the 
bilateral investment agreements.  
 
A distinction should be drawn between investments, aid and trade. This is because they are 
regulated by different policies and laws therefore subject to different rights and obligations.73 
Pippa Morgans described Chinese Aid, as a method of financing that is coming from the Chinese 
government to the hosting African government it involves concessional elements or that of the 
grant with political or developmental objectives.74 By virtue of its developmental history, China 
sees Aid as a ‘win-win’ arrangement. This process of mutual gain entails that if a country receives 
aid or a grant from the Chinese government, conditions are commonly set, that a Chinese company 
gets other contracts and sometimes permission to use its Chinese labour on the projects.75  This 
differs totally from the OECD countries that offer untangled aid and investment. Western donors 
attach conditions such as governance, human rights and democracy possibly as a mechanism of 
influencing African leaders to develop based on their values.  There is also an apparent difference 
in sector preference, the west mostly prefers social sectors such as hospitals, health care while 
China focuses more on economically productive sectors such as infrastructure.76 
 
Investments in this context refer to FDI. This is purely commercial in nature, the intention 
is to make a profit, either immediately or in a long-term arrangement.77 The complexity of these 
investment packages stems from the fact that they are tied and interlinked. This method has 
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advantages and disadvantages, firstly it allows the Chinese investor to get assurance that they will 
get more contracts in the country. Conversely, the disadvantages are that it undermines 
procurement laws and results in the unfair treatment of other foreign investors, furthermore, local 
companies are also denied access to those contracts as a result of this seemingly political 
favouritism.78  
There are also loans that might be included in these Chinese investments in Africa 
packages. The so-called concessional loans while counted within aid, it could be associated with 
commercial investments.79 Lastly, closer attention should also be paid to the fact that China is also 
involved in contracting. This is done by building infrastructures such as air and seaports, railways 
lines and buildings funded by the Chinese bank, international institutions such as the world bank 
or even the recipient government.80 Comprehensive data of a particular project is essential for the 
characterisation of Chinese aid and investment.81 For example, if it is a concessional loan, it is 
classified as aid, and if it is a non-concessional loan it is characterised as a form of financing. 
 
It is important to untangle the tied and packaged investment deals to ensure a deeper 
understanding of the implications of Chinse investments in Africa. The challenges considered in 
this paper, are as a result of FDI and not aid or loans, however, given their interlinked nature, it 
will possibly encroach in the areas linked to it.  
 
2.4.2 Actors in the field China Investments in Africa   
 
There are different actors who are recognised under international investment law. Some 
developing countries insist on joint ventures between the host state entities and multilateral 
corporations.82 Perhaps, as a method to encourage technology transfer and training local 
professionals on the management of international firms.83 An investor is usually defined in BITs 
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between the investing and the recipient country.  For example, the China-Zimbabwe bit defines an 
investor as:   
In respect of the People's Republic of China: 
(a) natural persons who have the nationality of the People's Republic of China 
in accordance with its laws; and 
(b) economic entities established in accordance with the laws of the People's 
Republic of China and domiciled in the territory of the People's Republic of China.84 
The definition is broad and wide to cover both, Chinese SOEs and Private Owned 
companies. For the purposes of this paper, the term 'Chinese' loosely is used to refer to both the 
State and persons of that country. A study of these actors will be done and the roles they play in 
Chinese investments in Africa.    
A. State-Owned companies  
Chinese’s state-owned businesses have a commercial agenda of their own, 
however, they have ties with the Communist Party of China, and the government.85 These 
include China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical 
Corporation CPCC and the China National Offshore Oil Corporation which has a 
considerable impact on both Beijing and Africa.86 They are involved in many of Africa's 
largest deals in key sectors such as mining, infrastructure and telecommunications.87 
Chinese investment has been criticised because of SOEs’ apparent focus on the extractive 
and construction industries.  
 
 
B) Privately-owned Companies  
Private Chinese investment is also on the rise and even surpassing in terms of numbers 
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According to field research by McKinsey, out of the estimated 10 000 Chinese businesses 
operating in Africa, 90 percent of them are privately owned.88 The large number can be explained 
examining China's motivations for promoting private Chinese investment in Africa. China 
encourages mature industries like textiles to move offshore in order to set up factories in lower-
income regions such as Africa.89 
The other actors in this relationship are the entities in the host countries, including public 
and private entities they might enter into a joint venture with. 
 
2.5 CHINESE MOTIVATIONS FOR INVESTING IN AFRICA  
 
It is important to consider the rationale behind China’s Go Out policy before delving into 
the motivations and determinants of Chinese investments in Africa.90 According to Klaver and 
Trebilcock, China aims to move up the manufacturing value chain, perhaps this is in line with a 
move from a labour-intensive economy to the knowledge-driven economy.91 China, therefore, 
encourages offshoring of matured factories to lower-income regions such as Africa.92 Secondly, it 
aims to turn its companies into global corporations.93 The primary motivations for Chinese 
investments in Africa, while there are more such as political support for the one-China policy, is 
natural resources and market access. 
 
2.5.1 Natural Resources as the primary motivation for Chinese FDI 
 
Deborah Brautigam alluded that Beijing’s engagement with Africa was a well thought out 
strategy.94 This deliberate approach was a reaction to China’s rapid growth which was outpacing 
its natural resource base, for example in 1993 China became the net importer of oil.95 It is not a 
surprise that Africa’s vast natural resources became an attraction to China.96 The US Energy 
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Information Administration predicts an increase in China's oil demand to 12.8 million barrels per 
day by 2025. 
China needs oil to maintain and support its growth and meet its increase in consumer 
demands.97 While the middle east is the largest exporter of oil in the world, China only imports 38 
per cent from that region and the sub-Saharan African region is the second-largest producer after 
the middle east, China gets 30 percent of its oil from this region.98 This need for oil and other 
natural resources is used by some observers to argue that China is only after plundering African 
resources without necessarily developing the countries, furthermore, that Chinese investments are 
not diverse enough as they are mostly concentrated in the high resource countries. 
Many Chinese investments in Africa are aimed at securing access to oil. Klaver and 
Trebilcock noted that: 
In 2002, Sinopec signed a $525 million deal to develop the Zaraitine oil field 
in Algeria. In 2003, CNPC purchased Algerian oil refineries for $350 million. 
In 2004, Sinopec signed a contract with Total Gabon to sell Gabonese crude 
oil to China. In 2005, PetroChina signed an $800 million crude oil deal with 
the Nigerian National Petroleum Company to supply 30,000 barrels of crude 
oil per day to China. In 2006, CNOOC signed an offshore exploration deal with 
Kenya to explore 44,500 square miles in the country. Chinese oil companies 
are reported to have signed offshore oil exploration contracts in Congo and 
Namibia. In 2006, China's Zhongyuan Petroleum Company began exploration 
drilling in Ethiopia.99 
 
This is not an exhaustive list of oil deals, but they do provide China’s preferred 
industries when investing. Rhys Owen Jenkins indicates that while oil and minerals 
are strategically important to China, the trade pattern between China is not a simple 
reflection of the Chinese State requirement.100 This is perhaps true given the complex 
nature of the economic engagement and the multiplicity of China objectives in Africa. 
   
Furthermore, Chinese investments in Africa are not limited to oil. Since China 
is also the world largest consumer of steel, copper, coal, platinum, and cement.101 
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SOEs in mining and other companies from different sectors such as construction and 
steel have invested in mines in Africa with the objective of increasing reserves and 
diversifying their activities.102  The investment in African resources are not limited to 
oil and mining but also includes agriculture, timber and fishing.103  
 
It is evident that the main motivation to invest in Africa is to acquire natural 
resources to supply its rapidly growing economy. It is, however, important to that it is 
mostly SOEs that are investing in these extractive sectors even though there is a 
significant number of small-scale Chinese operating in Africa.104 While SOEs 
investment in Africa is a reflection of both the strategic objectives of the Chinese state 
and commercial objectives of the SOEs themselves, private companies’ investment is 
purely commercially driven.105 
2.5.2 Market Access as the second motivation for Chinese FDI  
 
The second motivation for Chinese companies to invest in Africa to gain 
market access within Africa and the West.106 Numerous surveys have shown the 
importance of commercial considerations such as access to local markets, the 
advantage of African trade agreements, low production costs, and the availability of 
raw materials in private Chinese firm’s investment decisions.107 The African consumer 
market is attractive to companies that manufacture low-cost goods, some private 
companies relocate their business to Africa to reduce transportation costs.108 Chinese 
investments in manufacturing are largely in the textile sector, though recent studies 
show that they are diversifying into different sectors.109 Chinese companies have a 
significant presence in the textile sectors of many SADC countries such as South 
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The private companies are not limited to the manufacturing sector, for example 
in 2007, Hisense Group who previously exported electronic appliances and televisions 
to South Africa, built the Hisense Industrial Park in South Africa to expand production 
of refrigerators, washing machines, and televisions for the South African market and 
has since been successful in terms of access to the market, employment creation and 
technological and skills transfer.111 
 
The Chinese investment in the African manufacturing sector is not limitedly 
tailored for the African market. Chinese companies set up manufacturing operations 
in Africa to avoid trade barriers in wealthy countries by taking advantage of the 
preferential market access granted to African states by western nations.112 In 2000, the 
US government introduced  The African Growth Opportunities Act (AGOA) which 
has most countries in Africa preferential access to the US markets.113 Leading to a  
sharp rise in textile and garments exports to the US by African countries such as 
Lesotho, Madagascar, and eSwatini between 2000 and 2004.114 African countries also 
enjoy privileged access to developed markets under the world trade 
organisation(WTO) rules which remove rules of origin for least developed African 
countries (LCDs).115 In addition, the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA) also provided 
quota-based preferential access to LCDs.116 
 
Also, Europe has Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative that grants duty-free 
and quota-free access to all imports from LDCs and only excludes military weapons.117 
Deborah Brautigam correctly submits that AGOA was intended to boost African 
exports to the US while simultaneously, boosting US investment in Africa.118 She 
further notes that these programmes have had significant impacts on participating 
countries both positive and negative. 119 The problems resulted from complex rules of 
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origin which often limited duty-free access to products made from inputs that came 
from the African region.120 Her criticism, however, ignores the fact that it might have 
been a mitigating factor implemented to control the flooding of Chinese products in 
the US market under the African cover.  Rhys Owen Jenkins correctly noted that a 
combination of AGOA preferences, lack of rules of origin for LDCs African countries 
and US quotas on Chinese imports created an indirect channel through which firms 
could use participating countries as pathways for transhipment of Chinese garments 
and textile to the US markets.121 This arrangement negatively impacts on the nature 
and quality of Chinese investments in Africa since in many cases there was very 
minimal processing in the hosting African country as it was merely a country used to 
avoid US quota restrictions.122  
 
Africa should thus, leverage on its market access and insist on joint ventures 
with local companies since competition from Chinese companies can overwhelm 
domestic industries.  It is clear that access to African markets and Africa’s preferential 
market access to the west is a major motivation to Chinese investments in the African 
manufacturing sector.  
 
 
2.5.2 The importance of Chinese investment for SADC and Africa.   
 
There are many debates in Chinese investments in Africa, perhaps, one of the 
common questions is, how does Africa benefit? The answer to this question is not 
straightforward however, there has been significant research on the impact of Chinese 
investments. Any enquiry should, therefore, not blindly focus on China’s role players, 
prospective benefits since that approach risk clouding the contribution of the African 
agency and indeed the benefits these investments have on the African side.123 As 













Chinese businesses in Africa could unlock the potential of $440 billion in revenues by 
2025.124 This inevitably presents enormous economic growth for African countries.   
FIGURE 1:  CHINESE FDI VS US FDI FLOW INTO AFRICA 
 
Source:  2. CARI FDI DATA COMPILATION 
 
Figure 1 provides the statistics of FDI inflow Africa between China and the US. This 
comparison provides a position from which to compare the significance of Chinese FDI into 
Africa. This is because the West including the USA has been for a long time Africa’s only source 
of FDI since independence.   
Since the beginning of the 21st century, Chinese FDI into African has grown greatly from 
what appears to be less than a billion in comparison to the US. An explanation for this could be 
that the relations between African and China were more political than commercial as a result there 
was more aid than FDI, plus aid was not adequately recorded pre 2000.125  
 
While the Chinese FDI into Africa is growing, the only year it exceeded the US was in 
2008 when it was at US$5.5 billion.126 This is surprisingly low given the large figures that the 
Chinese government commit itself to such as the US$60 at the Johannesburg FOCAC Summit.127 
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Nevertheless, these figures show that Chinese FDI is increasing at a sustainable rate and possibly 
contributing to the  Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of African countries and the region. In 2014, 
the top 5 destinations FDI in 2014 were Algeria, Zambia, Kenya, Republic of Congo, and 
Nigeria.128 
 
Narrowing the focus of the analysis to other factors that can be used to explain the 
significance of Chinese FDI. Commodity prices increased by China’s demand for resources results 
in an increase in revenue.129 Most African countries are in a position to benefit from China’s 
hunger for resources, for example, Mozambique benefits from aluminium, South Africa from 
platinum and Zambia from Copper.130  
 
Secondly, a margin of African countries, while blessed with natural resources, lacks the 
technical capacity to extract resources on their own.131 Big Chinese SOEs such as Sinopec 
investments in African extractive industries boosting African natural resources output, therefore, 
resulting in increased revenues from which the individual country can effectively tax and channel 
the income to other areas of development.  
Thirdly, perhaps one of China’s visible contributions to African development is 
infrastructural building.132 This significantly contributes towards filling Africa’s infrastructure gap 
which currently estimated to be at $1 Billion. In 2015, Africa’s spending on infrastructure was 
around $80billion in nominal terms, however, as a share of GDP, it remained around 3,5 percent.133 
Infrastructural development is accelerated by China’s ‘resources for infrastructure’  which in 
essence consists of China providing financial assistance for construction projects in exchange of 
access to resources such as oil.134 Perhaps the most famous example is the Sicomines case. In 2007, 
China gave Congo access to a  $6.5 billion concessional loan to finance infrastructure.135 Chinese 
companies had to build or rehabilitate 3,500 km of tarred roads and 3,200 km of railways, and 
build 32 hospitals, 145 health centres, 2 universities, and 5,000 houses all in exchange for 
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resources.136 Even though this deal was subsequently renegotiated after outrage from the 
international community, it shows how a country which lacks money can use its natural resources 
to finance its own development, this is arguably a form of barter trading. Africa’s inadequate roads, 
lack of constant electricity supply and water supplies amongst other things, are addressed in this 
regard. This leads to African development. 
 
Fourthly, African countries benefit from Chinese investments in manufacturing, in that, it 
leads to industrialisation.137 The impact of Chinese investments on Africa’s industrialisation is 
limited, this can be attributed to competition from the Chinese businesses which African 
businesses cannot beat. However, there are significant contributions, such as construction 
companies opening factories that produce cement, glass, brick and other building materials which 
drastically reduce or even eradicate imports costs.138 They further, contribute through training and 
transferring technological skills to the workers.139 
 
Lastly, Chinese investments create employment as Chinese businesses hire Africans to 
work on their businesses. Mckinsey research found that 89 per of employees were African.140 For 
example, in Zimbabwe, Baosteel, a Chinese company created 2000 jobs through a 300-million-
dollar investment.141 Chinese investments can improve employment (this will be discussed in great 
detail chapter 3), they can also contribute to market access for African companies. 
 
All these factors reinforce that position that Chinese investments in Africa provide an 
economic relationship where Africa can use it as a catalyst for accelerated sustainable development 
and an avenue through which many firms, African, Chinese and other international firms can earn 






 Ibid.  
137




 Ibid.  
140
 Ibid at 11. 
141




2.6 Legal and Policy Frameworks   
 
The legal framework for foreign investment is complex and Chinese Investments in Africa 
are not an exception. Foreign investments are governed by international law and domestic laws of 
both the investing and the recipient jurisdiction.142 The host state has a right to control the entry of 
foreign investment in its jurisdiction, a right which stems from sovereign it.143 Therefore, typically 
domestic investment codes include provisions that attract FDI thereby improving their investment 
environment, in addition to that, they include provisions that safe guide FDI such as 'national 
treatment, most-favoured-nation treatment, tax incentives, security measures, and/or dispute 
resolution fora'.144 These laws determine the processes of how investments may be made in a 
specific country, the nature of rights and obligations of the host country’s government and the 
foreign investor.145 This section will examine the processes a Chinese entity is required to follow 
when investing overseas, and domestic legal regimes in SADC that governs foreign investment, a 
study of South Africa, and Zimbabwe will be used, this will reflect on the activities and processes 
in the rest of SADC countries.146 This study will focus on provisions relating to labour relations 
and transfer of skills and technology.  
 
2.6.1 Regulation of Chinese outbound investment 
 
Chinese regulators play an active role when it comes to controlling and monitoring 
overseas investments. In order to invest abroad, 'Chinese companies must go through 
administrative and approval procedures from the Ministry of Commerce MOFCOM, the National 
Development and Reform Commission NDRC, China Customs, and the State Administration of 
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In this process, The NDRC plays an important role in relation to major foreign and 
domestic investments within China and investment in certain significant industries, it is also 
responsible for verifying and approving outbound investments by Chinese entities.148 The factors 
it considers are amongst other things, if the project will endanger China’s state sovereignty, 
breaches of international law and if it meets other State requirements such as exporting of domestic 
technology equipment, labour and attracting foreign technology.149 Entities are, however, allowed 
to make investments decisions without its influence, they also carry the risk.   
 
The MOFCOM is a central entity through which all overseas investments are directed. Its 
approval is only required for large and sensitive investments projects, such as in a country in which 
the country has no business relationship or special purpose vehicles. 150 This organisation is 
responsible for formulating’ development strategies, guidelines and policies of domestic and 
foreign trade and international economic cooperation; to draft laws and regulations governing 
domestic and foreign trade, economic cooperation and foreign investment; and to devise 
implementation rules and regulations.151 
 
MOFCOM and SAFE conduct joint annual inspection of the required reporting, the 
compliance of Chinese local laws and regulations by Chinese enterprises abroad.152 This 
continuous supervision along with SAFE rules strengthens the ability of enterprises to provide 
loans to overseas investment businesses in addition to that, also saves as a pillar of the funding 
system for example, of loans from Chinese banks such as China Eximbank.153 This supervision is 
relevant for our purpose because it also gives a clear picture of the extent to which Chinese 
companies comply with local law and regulations. This requirement applies to all businesses 
registered in China, both state and central SOEs are subject to the supervision and regulation of 
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While this system of monitoring is impressive and promising, it has been criticised for 
having a limited scope.154 The focus is most likely to be centred from the perspective of Chinese 
legal compliance requirements. Whereas if the scope was extended to cover the whole CIA, the 
negative impacts of the investments could be reduced, this includes negativism from global media 
houses, scepticism from the African countries they operate. In 2006, the State Council, however, 
issued The Opinion on Encouraging and Normalizing Our Enterprises’ Investment Cooperation, 
which contained nine principles relating to the behaviour of outbound investments and the 
operations of Chinese companies abroad, this includes Africa. This opinion reiterated the 
importance of compliance with ‘local laws and regulation, local laws and regulations, exercising 
social responsibility to protect local employees and awareness of environmental protection.’155 
The purpose is seeming to protect the image and reputation of China since any illegal actions, such 
as corruption, abuse of labour and human rights would be an impact of China's Mianzi156 (saving 
face). In addition to that, in 2010 MOFCOM issued the Opinion of the Ministry of Commerce on 
the Work Regarding the Nationwide Work in Overseas Investment and Cooperation which 
emphasised the importance of creating a good image through respecting local laws and social 
responsibilities.157 It is clear from the issuing of these opinions that China recognises that there is 
a problem with regards to the behaviour of Chinese businesses in Africa. These guidelines while 
positive, they are not directives, law or strictly applied policy and for that reason creates no positive 
obligation of the businesses to comply. Put differently they are likely to be ignored. This is 
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2.6.2 THE ROLE OF AFRICA-CHINA MULTILATERAL BODIES AND 
TREATIES 
 
The legal framework between Africa and China mostly consists of bilateral agreements as 
opposed to multilateral treaties.  The main multilateral mechanism that provides an institutional 
platform to both Africa and China is FOCAC. It does not only deal with matters of politics but 
also investments and development. The discussion of this organisation is not exhaustive as such, 
only a brief overview is provided. This section will examine the Role of FOCAC, SADC MODEL 
FIC, the continental policies of the AU namely Agenda 2063 as a way of outlining Africa’s policy 
towards China.  
 
2.6.3 The History of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation 
 The FOCAC was established in 2000.158 It is a shared platform and a multilateral 
mechanism for African countries and China to hold collective consultations and practical 
cooperation.159 Since its establishment, six ministerial conferences have been held so far, these 
conferences are held every three years interchangeably between cities of Africa and China. 160 Two 
of these conferences, the one held in Beijing 2009 and the one held in Johannesburg 2015, were 
upgraded to summits. 161 
 
In an effort to establish an institutional framework for joint development some Africa 
leaders put forward a proposal to establish a for Africa-China multilateral cooperation 
mechanism.162 To which China agreed and the forum was born. The FOCAC process, therefore, 
provides a unique mechanism to promote multilateral dialogue between Africa and China. 163 
Secondly, it facilitates the development of common political and economic objectives and thirdly 
it serves as a platform through which Sino-African cooperation can be developed.164 
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African debt clearance opened doors for expanded market access and provided a wide 
range of new opportunities for positive engagement.  The characteristics of FOCAC are pragmatic 
cooperation, equality and mutual benefit.165 These attributes aim to strengthen consultation, 
cooperation, promote dialogue amongst other things, with the aim of achieving mutual 
reinforcement and common development between Africa and China.166  
 
The results of these FOCAC meetings are outlined in Action Plans setting commitments 
towards development, trade and investment.167 These include Economic Cooperation, Investment 
and Economic Cooperation, Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges, peace and security and 
Consultation and Cooperation Mechanisms. It is also through this platform that president Xi 
Jinping made a commitment of 60 billion US dollars financing to Africa.168  
 
Inevitably, there have been narratives of neo-colonialism against Chinese activities in 
Africa. These can be neutralised by an active role of African agency of the engagement.  Mary 
Chan, advanced that Sino-African relations are complex and multi-layered, and a cautious 
approach is required when debating China as a neo-colonial power.   
 
The scope of FOCAC is broad and covers different focused Actions Plans, for the purpose 
of this paper, we will only look at the role it plays at facilitating Investment, provides for labour 
relations and the transfer of technology between China and the African states.  It must, however, 
be noted that the disadvantage of these action plans is that they are not legally binding but only 
commitments that are promissory in nature. This does not make them valueless since judging from 
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2.6.4 SADC AND CHINA RELATIONS 
 
All SADC member states, excluding eSwatini, have diplomatic relations with China.169 
However, this has had no significant impact on Chinese engagement with the SADC secretariat.170 
Should there be stronger engagement with China, it is also possible for eSwatini to benefit 
indirectly under SADC projects since it can't be excluded from the programmes of SADC on the 
basis of the one-China policy.   
 
According to research by the Centre for Chinese Studies, several officials from the SADC 
secretariat were not familiar with FOCAC commitments. 171 One respondent, however, submitted 
that there was a limited engagement between China and Africa while there were very active 
bilateral relations with SADC member states.172  
 
The Beijing 2018 Action Plan: political Cooperation, shows significant progress in terms 
of the inclusion of the agency African union and its regional bodies. For example, it notes that 
China appreciates the ‘positive role of the African Union Commission since it became a member 
of the FOCAC and will continue to strengthen cooperation with and support for the New 
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD).173 This signals a potential vehicle to strategically 
integrate African development goals, at the national, regional and continental level. Furthermore, 




2.6.5 CHINA’S AFRICA POLICY  
 
In 2006, the Chinese government, for the first time issued a paper detailing its policy 
towards Africa.174  It contains, in six parts, ‘Africa’s position and role, China's relations with 
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Africa, China's African policy, and enhancing all-round cooperation between China and Africa’. 
175 The characteristics of this text, in terms of the body, language and structure, strongly resembles 
the FOCAC. It appears as if FOCAC action plans are vehicles through which China’s Africa policy 
is implemented.  China’s policy towards Africa is underpinned by values such as ‘Solidarity and 
cooperation’, ‘mutual benefit, reciprocity and common prosperity, and the one-China policy.176 
Under part IV (which deals with the economic field) of this text, China reiterated that it encourages 
and supports Chinese enterprises and investments in Africa. 177 While putting attention to the need 
for creating a favourable environment and the protection of legitimate rights and interests of both 
Chinese and African investors.178 
 
Under the title 'Education, science, culture, health and social aspects’ under science and 
technology cooperation, the text says that China will promote cooperation Africa in the fields of 
applied research, technological development and transfer.179 This signals the intention and 
willingness to transfer technology to the Africans, however, special attention must be paid to the 
nature of the language used. For example, words such as ‘promote’, ‘encourage’ or, and ‘commit’ 
significantly impact the weight of China’s duties and Accountability to the African side.  
   
In 2015, under President Xi Jinping, released a second Africa policy document with the 
objectives of further clarifying China's determination to develop relations with Africa and 
'expound the new vision, approach and measures of China's Africa policy under the new 
circumstances with the aim of guiding the multi-faceted exchanges and cooperation between China 
and Africa in the years to come.’180 The very fact that the new document speaks of 'China's Africa 
policy under the new circumstances’ denotes that China re-strategised its approach to Africa. 181It 
is clear that China's policies serve to make it reach its national development as opposed to China 
developing Africa. The significance of this understanding is that the African side should be able 
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China also aims to achieve its “two centenary goals" and the ‘Chinese dream’ which in 
essence is about making China a ‘moderately prosperous society ‘by 2021.182 In addition to that, 
there is a signal of intensifying reforms and advancing law-based governance.183 The new policy, 
however, refers to Africa's Agenda 2063 which implies that Chinese policymakers have taken note 
of Africa's long-term development goals.184The ‘Agenda: 2063185 is a continental development 
agenda that constitute various goals and priorities for Africa such as for our purposes, the need for 
self-financing for African development projects, having capable institutions and transformative 
leadership in peace, improved infrastructure across African countries and areas such as decent job 
creation, education and knowledge-driven revolution, sustainable economic growth.186  
 
This Agenda is also linked with the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs), SGD Goal 1 refers to 'ending poverty in all forms' and goal 8 refers to the promotion of 
sustainable economic growth with full employment and decent work for all.187 The most standard 
definition of sustainable development, according to the Brundtland Report: "Sustainable 
development is a development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs."188 This also serves as a framework for Chinese 
investments in Africa since both parties are members of the UN.  While Agenda 2063 and NEPAD 
are Africa’s only documents that could be classified as a policy. They are broad and long term 
based. Despite evidence that there is a growing strong African agency in the FOCAC action plans 
of what the African wants from China. It is almost two decades after the first FOCAC, despite the 
growing investments and trade between Africa and China. There is still no Africa's China policy 
detailing at least a structure or its interests in the China-Africa discourse.189 While it may be argued 
that individual countries may have developed strategic policies towards China, the evidence to 
support this argument is scarce.190 While China benefits both multilaterally and bilaterally, the 
African side risk only benefiting only through bilateral engagements. A detailed African China’s 
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policy would aid individual African countries in terms of having leverage during investment and 
trade negotiations with China and it would prioritise and accelerate both their national and regional 
goals as it would form a framework for the relations instead of its interests merely a consideration.   
 
2.6.6 THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK  
A. Bilateral investment treaties   
 
The law that governs Chinese investments in Africa is primarily domestic codes of China 
and the hosting African states. There are no international treaties regulating both sides rather, 
investments are done mostly through bilateral relations.191 Therefore, the primary legal framework 
for Chinese investments is bilateral treaties (BITs) between China and the individual African 
country. To date, China has over 31 BITs with African countries including SADC countries such 
as South Africa, Zambia and Zimbabwe.192  BITs establishes the terms of conditions for private 
investments made by a business from one jurisdiction to another.193 They commonly grant 
investors from a contracting State certain guarantees that include ‘fair and equitable treatment,’194 
protection against expropriation of property without compensations and often provision of 
arbitration in case of disputes between the investor or state and the host state.195 The effectiveness 
of BITs as a method of attracting foreign investments has been called into question since a 
significant number of host countries and investors avoid concluding BIT.196 Africa and China have, 
however, shown serious commitment and encouragement of mutual investment and 
implementation of BITs.197 
 
 In 2015, The Legal Forum for China-Africa Cooperation officially established the China-
Africa Joint Arbitration Centre (CAJAC) which serves as a Dispute Resolution Mechanism for 
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trade and investment disputes between African and Chinese investors and business people.198 To 
date, there are three CAJAC centres in Johannesburg, Nairobi and Shanghai.199  
 
The SADC region drafted a Model bilateral investment treaty which was completed in 
2012.200 The significance of the SADC BIT is that links FDI with sustainable development. Its 
preamble reads the ‘Main objective of this Agreement is to encourage and increase investments … 
that support the sustainable development of each Party, and in particular the Host State where 
investment is to be located.’201 It further attempts to balance the rights and obligations of investors 
and State parties. The China-Africa BITs are typically silent on the matter on labour and rights of 
employees and the environment. The SADC BIT has clear provisions aided by commentary on 
issues for example under Article 22 highlights that it is inappropriate to encourage investment by 
relaxing domestic environmental and labour legislation.202 The limitation of this template is that it 
is not legally binding on the SADC members, and it is used only as a negotiation tool, but its 
weight and importance cannot be underestimated.  Consequently, this paper will utilise this model, 
as the current Sino-Africa BITs lack provisions on the investor’s obligation and as such, silent on 
the problems under discussion.  
b. Other applicable Legislation 
 
The domestic laws of the investing country and that of the host country also forms part of 
the international investment legal framework.  Hence, different countries in SADC have different 
laws. The relevant African laws relating to investments, and labour, technological transfers as 
unilateral frameworks will be discussed in the following chapter.  
In addition to the referred to domestic laws, there are also international standards and 
regulations that legally bind China and African countries.  Thus far, China has ratified 25 pieces 
of International Labour Organisation (ILO) convention.203 In terms of the core labour standards of 
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the ILO China has notably failed to ratify conventions related to forced labour,  Yaw Baah and 
Jauch argue this is because the prison labour and re-education system still exists in China.204 
Perhaps, this contributes to the narratives that China uses prison labour even in Africa.205 Other 
examples included Convention 100 and Convention 111 on the elimination of discrimination in 
respect of employment and occupation and no.138 (Minimum Age Convention), no. 182 (Worst 
Forms of Child Labour),206 freedom of association and the right to organize (no. 87 and no. 98).207 
 
Furthermore, China and African countries have ratified a significant number of 
international human rights, namely the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and they 
are all members of the United Nations.208 Under the UDHR there are provisions related to labour 
rights, for example, art. 23, meaning that there is a positive obligation on both parties to respect 
and fulfil these labour rights.209  Both sides have also ratified the  International Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights Covenant (ICESCR 1966) which has specific labour rights clauses.210 China 
signed this convention with a reservation of Article 8 on freedom of association.211 Meaning that 
even if Chinese companies are operating in very weak legal environments there are international 
regulations through which they could be held accountable. 
 
 
C. Chinese Labour Laws 
 
In Africa, Chinese domestic laws do not apply however, they form part of the standard 
through which we need to assess the behaviour of Chinese business entities in Africa.212 Guan 
notes that it took China 40 years to enact its first comprehensive labour law.213 While China has a 
poor record there is a significant improvement. According to China Labour Bulletin, the most 
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important laws governing labour relations in China are 5 Labour Law, 1992 Trade Union Law 
(amended 2001),  2008 Labour Contract Law (amended 2013), and the 2008 Labour Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Law.214 These laws provide a legal framework which gives a work 
various rights and protection against exploitation by the employer, this includes right to be paid in 
full and on time, a formal employment contract, unemployment, work injuries and maternity leave, 
severance pay in the event of contract termination, equal pay for equal work, and protection against 
workplace discrimination.215  
 
In China workers are provided with reputable institutions of mediation and arbitration and 
the court systems, this means that should the local government show unwillingness to enforce the 
law, the affected worker can still utilise these institutions.216 This dispute mechanism is important 
as it allows problems to be solved in a reasonable time. Many African countries do not have ADR 
mechanism for labour disputes, the disputes end up at the courts which negatively impact the image 
and reputation of Chinese investments in Africa. On paper the Chinese Labour law looks excellent, 
however, businesses and employers in China still disregard the law, withholding wages and social 
security payments, refusing to pay work-related injury and illness compensation, and firing 
employees with almost no consequences.217 
 
Evidently, the labour problems in China and Africa are the same, these labour laws serve 
a benchmark through which we can understand the attitude of the Chinese authorities and the 
business entities operating in Africa.  
 
2.7 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has established that there are both positives and negatives under Chinese 
investments in Africa.  Despite the many debates surrounding these investments, it seems that 
many concerns are as a result of a misunderstanding of the often complex and non-traditional 
approach to investments. While China has an Africa policy document that is constantly updated in 
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response to its development objectives, Africa lacks a regional uniform document detailing its 
policy towards China. Therefore, this chapter reveals that there is a need for Africa under AU and 
as individual countries to draft an authoritative China policy document that will allow them to 
strategically benefit from Chinese investments in Africa. In addition to that, there is also a need to 
have a legally binding regional uniform investment framework to regulate these investments as 
this will ensure consistency and accountability from all the role players.  
 
In the view of the above conceptual and theoretical analysis, this paper maintains that 
Chinese investments are of great significance for African development. Unfortunately, Africa does 
not have a China policy and a multilateral investment treaty as such, there is an inadequate 
systemic regulation, which in turn, disadvantage African countries from maximising their benefits. 
On that basis, the following chapter will discuss the central challenges faced by Chinese 


























CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS OF CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN AFRICA 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
 ‘The productive employment of labour presupposes an increase of the general level of education 
and the acquisition of technical skills, and, the formation of a body of capable administrators and 
entrepreneurs.’218 Chinese investments in Africa offer a good avenue through which all these 
benefits can be enjoyed by both Africa and China. However, the rapid growth of Chinese 
Investments in Africa inevitably, perhaps, as expected, resulted in an experience of various 
commercial problems.  
 
Whilst the challenges faced under this Africa-China discourse are many, the following two 
challenges have been identified as particularly threatening to the sustainable development of 
Chinese investments in Africa. Also, these two problems were selected because of their centrality 
in Africa- China commercial relations. These challenges are Chinese businesses labour relations 
in Africa and the lack of technology and skills transfers in Chinese projects in Africa.   This chapter 
discusses the above-mentioned challenges from a legal perspective, and it will also provide a case 
study for each challenge.  
 
3.2 LABOUR RELATIONS AND WORKING CONDITIONS UNDER CHINESE 
COMPANIES IN AFRICA  
 
This is arguably the most controversial aspect of Chinese investment in Africa.219 Any 
discussion on China’s engagement with Africa brings about the question of Chinese business’ 
labour practices on the continent. Perhaps other arguments are factual, others are misunderstood 
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myths peddled by the media and hearsay. The book ‘Chinese investments in Africa: a labour 
perspective’220 which undertook extensive research on the labour practices in southern Africa 
showed that the practices were not the same in all countries.221 Given that, there is a difference 
between countries, sectors, and individual countries.222 However, this research showed that there 
were some common trends in terms of the labour practices by Chinese enterprises in Africa; these 
included serious charges such as tense labour relations, hostile attitudes towards trade unions, 
various violations and abuse of workers’ rights, poor working conditions and several instances of 
discrimination and unfair labour practices.223 These incidents are discussed below from a legal 
perspective.  
 
3.2.1 GENERAL WORKING CONDITIONS   
 
The state and nature of labour relations between African workers and Chinese businesses 
can be illuminated by the study of working conditions under their employment arrangements. One 
of the common features of Chinese hiring system is the absence of employment contracts and the 
unclear determination of wages and employment benefits.224 This is classified as the casualization 
of employment. The issue of casualization of employment is of great significance in the Africa-
China debate because, for example, a permanent job in a factory or mine means that an African 
worker secures a fairly high income, access to medicine and a contract which could be used as 
collateral for personal bank loans.225 Deborah Brautigam alludes that, Chinese companies in Africa 
typically apply the same low standards employed in especially small towns and villages of 
China.226 Consequently, this would result in the transplant of Chinese unfair practices into the 
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A lack of employment contracts which results in the ‘casual workers’ deprives employees 
of legal protection and weakens the African authority’s power of labour regulation. The same 
research observes that even in some countries such as Angola that requires the classification of 
workers as permanent staff after a few months, some Chinese companies still classified them as 
casual workers thereby depriving them of the benefits that they are legally entitled to.227 This 
practice is a clear disregard or avoidance of the law. Many academics and commentators have 
argued that the problem of Chinese businesses not abiding by the law is because of Chinese 
ignorance of local African labour regulations.228 This justification is baseless in law since 
ignorance of the law cannot be an excuse. There is a positive obligation on all and not only Chinese 
enterprises to observe and familiarise themselves with the labour laws of the hosting country 
before doing business. In response to this problem, Mozambique translated its labour laws from 
Portuguese into Chinese.229 
 
Deborah Brautigam further argues it is not only African workers that encountered unfair 
working practices but Chinese workers too.230 She used an example of 200 Chinese construction 
workers in Equatorial Guinea who allegedly went on strike in the frontier town of Mongomo, 
leading to a violent clash with local security forces in which two Chinese workers were killed.231 
She also noted that these low standards are not limited to Chinese businesses since her research 
showed that in Namibia 80 per cent of the small businesses owned by Namibia failed to follow 
local labour laws.232 This is potentially true since in Africa there is a large informal sector, which 
is largely unregulated by the local labour laws. However, this should not be used to justify or 
normalise the abuse of labour laws and bad working conditions under Chinese investments in 
Africa.  
 
 Research also showed that despite comprehensive stipulations in national labour 
legislation, a large number of Chinese employers disregarded the provisions for a break, thereby 
forcing workers to work with long hours without rest.233 Muna Ndulo, concur with Deborah 
Brautigam, in that these are problems associated with foreign investment from the Chinese and the 
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western world.234 This includes exploitation of workers through the payment of low wages; 
unsatisfactory working conditions such as those relating to the health and safety of workers.235 
Acknowledging that these problems regardless of the race or the origin of the investor.236 Irene 
Yuan Sun also reflects this position, when she said, ‘If I had my way, we’d talk about firms by 
sector, not by nationality.’237 This would perhaps, result in a better and honest study of Chinese 
investments in Africa.    
 
3.2.2 EMPLOYMENT OF CHINESE LABOURERS OVER THE AFRICAN 
WORKER 
 
There is a strong belief that Chinese businesses hire Chinese workers instead of local 
African people.238 This claim, however, isn't supported by any data.239 However, this accusation 
has to be considered since this is the view that is occupied by many Europeans and Americans, 
including Africans.240 This damages the reputation of Chinese investments in Africa and it also 
fuels Xenophobic attitudes towards Chinese businesses. 
 
Tang Xiaoyang observed that the increased migration of Chinese people working into 
African who is estimated to be two million, to be a contributing factor to the wrong perceptions of 
Chinese hiring practices.241 He further contended that the employment of local workers is 
encouraged by governments and is an economic consideration by Chinese businesses.242 Africa 
has a growing youthful population entering the labour market yearly which puts some political 
pressures on Governments to ensure that there is the localization of employment at the Chinese 
firms. Many African governments strictly regulate the employment of locals and issuing of work 
permits to foreign workers.243  For example, there is a policy in Angola that requires 70 per cent 
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of the company’s workers to be Angolans.244 However, it appears as if this policy can be relaxed 
for certain urgent public projects.245 Perhaps, a significant aspect of legislative enforcement in 
many African countries, this exceptionalism allows investors to negotiate the application of certain 
legal provisions to a particular project which renders the whole law ineffective despite the benefits 
of the project being built.  
 
According to McKinsey Research Chinese businesses greatly provide locals with jobs, but 
not many manager positions.246 In more than 1000 companies which were surveyed. 89 percent of 
the employees were locals, creating more than 300 000 jobs for African workers.247 This research 
estimates that Chinese firms, estimated to be over 10 000, employs over a million African 
workers.248  
 
Despite the high costs from importing Chinese labour, businesses are forced to bring 
Chinese workers to Africa at the beginning of their operations.249 Tang Xiaoyang indicates the 
reasons to include, the fact that Chinese workers are familiar with the companies organization and 
process, therefore,  because of their experience, they will be able to get the project running quicker 
and lastly,  the experienced workers can also provide on the job training to local workers.250 
Therefore, from a Chinese perspective, it may be necessary to use Chinese technical workforce to 
realise their projects. But there are lots of benefits from using local works for both Chinese 
enterprises and local communities.251 
 
 
It has now been uncovered that Chinese businesses significantly hire local workers, but 
research shows that workers at management level are largely Chinese. McKinsey Research shows 
that out of the Chinese owned companies they surveyed only 44 percent of the managers were 
locals.252 A small number of Chinese firms also had 80 percent consisting of local management. 
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253 This is expected of many companies that are formed under FDI or foreign-owned. Carlos Oya 
in his research on the employment patterns and conditions in Angola observed a trend in which 
firms including Chinese businesses of relying on experienced managers with international 
experience and a stronger knowledge of the company systems and corporate culture. In this survey, 
only two foreign firms out of thirty had Angolan managers together with Portuguese and the rest 
relied on ex-pat managers.254  
 
It further shows that even Angolan companies employ a substantial number of ex-pat 
managers who are largely Brazilian and Portuguese.255 This significance of this practice lies in the 
fact that there is perhaps a lack of qualified workers to fill managerial positions in some African 
countries. Some Chinese firms reported economic constraints and growing difficulties in retaining 
Chinese ex-pat labour for longer periods of time.256 Consequently, this encouraged some firms to 
train African workers to become managers. The advantages are plenty, for example, an increase 
of integration with the community in which the firm operates, the mitigation of language barriers 
that exist between Chinese business and African workers.  
 
It is necessary to also consider factors hindering management localisation beyond personal 
preference of Chinese firms. African governments should ensure that their workers are adequately 
and practically trained thereby enlarging the semi-skilled and skilled pool.257 Conversely, Chinese 
companies should nurture their image, as their bad reputation of demanding long hours, or lower 
wages discourages African well trained and experienced workers.258  
 
Finally, it may be difficult to legislate laws that require the appointment of Africans as that 
would cloud the investment environment in that country. Art. 7 of the SADC BIT discourages a 
country from imposing the appointment of senior management and employees.259 This should, 
however, be balanced with the underlying benefits of FDI such as skills transfer.260 
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3.2.3 LOW WAGES  
 
It is beyond a reasonable doubt that Chinese investments in Africa provide jobs and 
employment for local workers. This positive development has been clouded by perceptions that 
workers at Chinese businesses are paid low wages.  Xiaoyang argued that according to various 
studies the finding has not been unanimous.261 In Ethiopia, a worker at a Chinese factory said, "I 
get paid 1,200 Birrs ($ 44) a month with overtime,” she says. “After rent and food, there is nothing 
left. My cousin has to support me.” 262Andrew brooks discovered a similar situation at Mulungushi 
textile in Zambia, where the wage described as not being sufficient to cover the basic needs of a 
family.263 These statements are worrisome since it would mean that Africa is not sufficiently 
benefiting from the Chinese investment in Africa. And perhaps it would feed credence to the 
rhetoric of some critics of the Africa-china economic engagement.  
 
Deborah Brautigam argued that China’s perspective on the issue of low wages in Africa 
was reflected in the advice given to Namibia but its economic and commercial counsellor, Liu 
Kungyuan.264 “If you sacrifice on labour costs now for future generations, then Namibia will 
develop. Let people be paid lower wages now and attract more FDI and set up manufacturing so 
that the future generation will reap the benefits of the sacrifices.265 This advice reflected on China's 
own development model that resulted in millions of people getting jobs in china.266 However, 
while low wages drastically increase revenues of a firm by reducing expenses, it does not by itself 
result in the increase of jobs of employment of local workers. A similar perception is shared by 
some Chinese managers at least in practice. In a comparison of labour standards between NFCA's 
Chambishi mine and Swiss-owned Mopani and Indian owned KCM mine, Li Pengtao discovered 
that while NFCA's had a bought a defunct mine for USD 160 million other mines bought already 
functioning mines.267 Because it had to recruit new workers and train them as opposed to other 
firms who already had experienced workers in place it paid considerably lower salaries in order to 
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recoup the huge investment.268 This business logic can be found among Chinese companies in 
other African countries such as Ethiopia.269 This logic works well in a country such as China with 
a controlled economy, where labourers genuinely believe that they are working for their countries' 
future development as opposed to a worker, who works primarily for taking care of his family. 
Perhaps, this is the reason why Africans have not accepted such arguments, for example, labourers 
in China-Africa Overseas Tannery often left the company immediately after they received their 
wage.270 This further deprives the companies off committed, skilled and experienced workforce.  
 
Xiaoyang argued that even though there are complaints about Chinese companies that pay 
less, these companies may, in the long run, be beneficial to the local communities since they 
heavily invest in machinery and infrastructure.271 This is potentially correct since the investment 
can create linkages with the national economy and create an environment for potential direct and 
indirect employment and entrepreneurial opportunities. The limitation of this argument, however, 
is that he is silent of the communities or the workers getting a form of shares in the Chinese 
business’ firms. This would greatly contribute to the African workers' willingness to low pay if in 
the end, they are likely to benefit.        
 
 Generally, FDI investors including Chinese investors consider cheap labour as a 
motivation for investing in a particular region or country, especially in areas such as manufacturing 
and construction sectors. Africa is largely a developing continent and provides a large pool for 
cheap labour. It is then significant to study the aforementioned wages from a legal perspective, 
and perhaps test it against the minimum wages legislated by the respective African countries.  
 
According to a study on minimum wages in Sub-Saharan Africa by The Institute for the 
Study of Labour (IZA), many countries in the region have adopted minimum wage regulations.272 
It distinguished between the typically ‘formal, wage-earning sector and usually large informal, a 
non-wage-earning sector in most African countries. 273 However, only a small fraction of the 
continent’s workforce is covered under the wage-earning sector, given the low rates of 
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urbanisation and formality in Africa.274 This research further discovered that non-compliance with 
minimum wage is widespread.275 It estimated on average that 58 per cent of workers earn below 
the legislated minimum wage.276 
 
This study provides a perspective through which to understand the practices of Chinese 
businesses on the ground. Minimum wage systems are usually classified in three broad categories 
national, sectoral (Occupational), and Hybrid (which may be a combination of the first two).277 A 
report by ILO (2013) revealed that the majority of countries in Africa use the sectorial or 
occupational minimum wage as opposed to one national wage covering all sectors.278 For example, 
in a Chinese road rehabilitation project in Angola, salaries were always above the sector minimum 
wage even though they were very close to the minimum.279  Whilst this is perfectly legal, a fair 
income should be high enough to ensure that workers are not living in poverty.280 Indeed, wages 
are always sufficient to help a worker meet the basic needs of life and their families.281  
 
Often ignored is the recruitment presences of Chinese firms, Carlos Oya alluded that they 
target workers with lower-wage reservations.282 He indicated that the intention is not to benefit 
from low wages but rather more in labour control and discipline.283 He termed this a ‘dormitory 
labour regime’ noting that while the employer may take advantage of the workers low bargaining 
power, these businesses are however creating lots of jobs and employing people who would 
otherwise not find employment in their communities.284 
  
The wages are also different amongst Chinese firms and workers. In this context, while 
wages paid by Chinese firms are usually lower in some categories. There are subjective 
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characteristics and elements of workers that determines wages including their job tenure, work 
experience, education and socio-economic status, combined with the sector, skill-level of jobs.285  
 
Recent research has also shown that some firms are using the "reward system” to attract 
local worker’s hard work.286 This reward system includes ‘career development for assiduous 
workers, promotion to management posts, bonuses financial support to worker’s personal 
issues.’287 This shows that some Chinese firms have greatly improved or at least responded to the 
criticism. Perhaps, Zambia’s ex-Minister of Commerce, Félix Mutati, was right when he insisted 
that with over 200 different companies acting differently.288 It is only fair to have practical 
examples instead of a generalised view.289 Therefore, in summary, Chinese firms are creating 
many jobs for local workers, however, the firms should be regulated in terms of remuneration. A 
stable workforce would help increase production and while employment creation buys authorities 
political life during elections, the temptation to sacrifice workers’ rights over statistics should be 
avoided, since it would taint the positive impact of Chinese investments in Africa.  
 
3.2.4 TRADE UNIONS, BARGAINING AND LABOUR CONFLICTS  
 
The management of employment in Chinese investments in Africa is equally an important 
issue. Given the labour-related conflicts and concerns such as victimisation, discrimination and 
violation of workers’ rights, an effective mechanism of conflict resolution is necessary. There is a 
wide belief that Chinese business operators are strongly hostile towards trade unions. Some 
managers see these organisations as troublemakers, instead, they opt to unilaterally determine 
wages, salaries and working conditions of their workers.290 This position is similar to that of the 
Urafiki textile, Chinese general manager Huang Lian whom in response to striking workers felt 
that workers unions were inconsiderate towards the economic stability of the company.291  
Inevitably, Chinese firms business practice presents unique challenges for organizing workers in 
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Africa mainly in the construction and mining industries.292 The reason for this challenge is the 
casualisation of workers is seemingly preferred by Chinese employers. In some African countries 
only, permanent workers can join a trade union. Furthermore, Africa has a large informal sector 
which is not presented by trade unions.  The behaviour of Chinese business is, however, not 
homogenous, they differ according to the company and industry. The study by the African Labour 
Research Network (ALRN) also found that some Chinese firms in countries with strong 
organisational cultures behaved more friendly towards trade unions and industrial resolution 
mechanism.293 This signals the capability of the firms to comply with the law.   
 
Labour issues are problems that Chinese companies must face during their operations in 
Africa. The causes of conflicts are different. In Kenya, some Chinese employers complained of 
local workers’ laziness and unreliability, they claimed that local workers often skipped work and 
only returned upon the depletion of their wages.294 Therefore, left with no choice but to pay them 
on a daily basis. Similar sentiments were expressed by Chinese managers in Angola including 
accusations of theft.295Perhaps, these are the effects of casualization of employment, it has 
advantages and disadvantages for both employer and employee. For example, while the employer 
gains from not according to employee benefits accorded by law such as medical aid, paid leave. 
The business is also deprived of hard-working, experienced and reliable workers. In relation to the 
victimisation and violation of workers’ rights, the SOAS research workers did not report verbal 
and physical abuse.296 However, interviews suggested the occurrence of abuse even though this 
was not unique to Chinese firms.297 Most commonly there is also a problem of communication 
barriers between Chinese employers and the low skilled workers which often results in conflicts.298 
It explains why locals in Angola speak of Chinese ‘management style’ concerning how some 
Chinese firms behave in terms of labour relations. The ALRN reported that even when some 
Chinese managers pretend that they can’t communicate in English during collective bargaining 
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thereby rendering the process ineffective.299 And more shockingly, the unions claimed the 
collective bargaining process was purposefully made slow and tedious with some managers 
arguing that they receive mandates from their bosses back in China.300 The statement, if true, would 
infringe on the sovereignty of the host African country and potentially break international law.   
 
Based on the literature, it is safe to conclude that Chinese businesses generally prefer no 
interaction with trade unions. However, they cannot forbid workers from joining the trade unions 
since they have a positive obligation under core ILO regulations, many constitutions also provide 
for freedom of assembly. The Chinese business logic should, however, not be dismissed without a 
careful study since not all issues should be resolved by law, sometimes consultation and 
negotiation within the workplace is more beneficial to all relevant parties.    
    
3.2.5 DISCUSSION FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
The discussion above has set out the state of Chinese investments in Africa concerning 
labour. From the basic working conditions, the issue of localisation and employment of Chinese 
workers over local workers, wages and the relations with African trade unions. These problems 
are not unique to Chinese investments in Africa but are common in other employment avenues. 
Unique, to our study, is perhaps techniques of dispute resolution.  
  
Zhicong Deng in the article 'Chinese companies labour Dilemma in Kenya' presents a 
typical problem relating to protesting workers with a trade union. The Chinese retail company 
which builds and sells houses employs local construction workers and salespersons.301 All 
management staff are Chinese including the chief engineer, project manager and the foreman.302  
Ten local workers protested against the delay of wage payment which the company paid, however, 
the same workers brought in trade unions claiming unfair dismissal.303 The company responded 
by hiring a lawyer to help them solve the issue. They dismissed this claim by saying there was no 
dismissal either in a verbal or written form.304 Secondly, the workers were required to prove that 
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they were continuously employed by that company for several years, but they couldn't prove this 
since the company had no employment contracts with the workers.305 In this case, these workers 
were casual workers and paid daily they could, therefore, not proved that they worked for many 
years at that company. And as a result, their claims dropped.306 
 
These conflicts are common under Chinese investments in Africa. Many countries have 
standard procedures for disgruntled employees to lodge the complaints. In Kenya, an employee 
must first communicate directly with the employer, and there is still a misunderstanding the worker 
should complain to the labour department.307 Thirdly, two primary steps fail the worker can sue 
the employer in the industrial court.308  
 
The legal framework is therefore available, for the protection of local workers in many 
African countries. Corruption and bribery is another major obstacle for the implementation of 
labour laws in Africa.  Many local workers, mentioned that in response to labour disputes, Chinese 
companies simply settle the disputes by ‘giving the labour officers, policemen or even the members 
of the trade union some tips.’309 So, it is evident corruption constitutes significantly to the 
exploitation of workers through not effectively monitoring violations in the workplace or 
preventing reform.310 
 
4. Employment, labour relations and working conditions at Chinese companies: 
South Africa country Case Study 
 
This section considers Chinese investments in South Africa. These investments are diverse 
and can be found in various sectors which include ‘energy, technology, mining and metallurgy, 
electronics, telecommunication, textiles, commercial banking, transportation, manufacturing, 
construction and automobiles.’ Chinese FDI into South Africa reached USD 15.2 bn in 2017, 
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making them the largest receiver of Chinese investments after Nigeria.311 Beijing is also South 
Africa’s largest trading partner.312 There are, however, challenges for Chinese firms investing in 
South Africa, mainly the dominance and strength of local industries on its domestic market and 
increased investment regulations and labour laws.313 This has not deterred investments as south 
African also offers a gateway into (southern) Africa.314  
 
More interestingly South Africa is one of a few African countries significantly FDI into 
China.315 For example, SABMiller, a South African company entered into a joint venture with 
China's largest brewer serving over thirty-three breweries across the country.316 The significance 
of the reciprocity in investments is that perhaps, the gap of imbalance is reduced since both parties 
are likely to prioritise mutual benefit on both ends. 
 
The dynamics of the South African legal, financial and labour systems offer great case 
studies that can be reflected on other African countries and perhaps serve as a model towards 
managing investments. This case study, therefore, to bring into context the understanding of legal 
implications of Chinese businesses’ behaviours in relation to Employment, labour relations and 
working conditions at Chinese companies.  
 
4.1 Applicable South African labour laws 
 
South Africa has a compressive and strong labour regulatory regime. These include the 
Labour Relations Act (1995) (the LRA), Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1997) (the BCEA), 
Equity Employment Act (1998) and Skill Development Empowerment Act (1998).317 In addition,  
labour market institutions such as the Bargaining Councils and Wage boards that set sectoral 
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minimum wages and controls working workings in respect of many industries.318 For many years 
South Africa had occupation minimum wage but recently it has promulgated the National 
Minimum Wage regulations Act, 2018.  Which is currently set at R20 per hour.319 Interestingly, 
firms in financial difficulties can apply for exemptions to it.320 
 
South African workers’ rights are provided in the country’s supreme Constitution.321 These 
rights include a Right to fair labour practices, form and participate in trade unions.322 This right is 
also extended to employers and trade unions under the same provision.  The LRA Act further seeks 
to protect rights of employees, employers and trade unions by way of giving effect to the RSA 
Constitution and Convention 87 of the ILO, which protects the freedom of association for workers 
and the right to organise within the workplace.323  In South Africa companies must also comply 
with Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) legislation. Perhaps, one most 
challenging regulatory requirement faced by Chinese companies in the country.324 This act seeks 
to protect the rights of previously disadvantaged communities by setting targets of ownership, 
management control and skills development amongst other things.325  Despite this, there have been 
reports that some Chinese companies disregard “almost all provisions enacted in the LRA, 
convention 87 of the ILO and the BCEA.326 This, however, requires more study to avoid Chinese 
exceptionalism.  
 
4.2 Employment and Labour relations  
 
Like in other African countries, international observers have been suspicious about the 
quality of Chinese investment in South African impact on employment.327 However, field 
Research by Meibo and Peiqiang that assessed the employment of Chinese businesses in South 
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Africa discovered that Chinese investment contributed towards an increment of employment for 
both the skilled and unskilled local population.328 The country hosts big Chinese companies such 
as Sinosteel, Hisense, Sinoprima Investment which contributes thousands of job creation.329 This 
means that Chinese investment, in addition to its current contribution can contribute more 
employment in various sectors.330  
 
There is also high localization of labour rates in South Africa, this could possibly be 
contributed to government immigration strict rules on the employment of foreigners.331 For 
example, if there is a skilled and competent South African citizen for a particular vacancy, he or 
she should get first preference and should not be disadvantaged by a foreigner.332  In addition, 
section 38(2) of the Immigration Act prohibits an employer from employing an illegal 
immigrant.333 This provision puts a positive obligation on an employer to ascertain the immigration 
status of a worker before the employment.334 It also carries severe fine and punishment should an 
employer be caught in contravention of the Act. Therefore, Chinese businesses are careful not to 
be caught in violation of the South African law thereby increasing their contribution towards 
employment and skills development.  
 
4.2.1 Working conditions  
 
Any discussion of Chinese investment in South African should include a deeper 
consideration of the South African labour market itself, so as to avoid bias. While the county has 
been substantially developing since apartheid the unemployment rate is always estimated to be 
around 25 per cent.335 Second, there is a large African immigrant community in the labour pool in 
South Africa and there have been reports of Chinese and other businesses preferring them at the 
expense of the locals. For example, recently seven Chinese nationals were raided for operating a 
factory in Johannesburg which involved allegedly trafficking of illegal immigrants and forced 
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labour.336 A total number of 91 Malawian nationals were found 37 of which were children.337 This 
behaviour contravened many South African laws and international law. These include National 
Minimum Wage (NMW), Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Act, the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (BCEA), the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act (Coida), 
the Unemployment Insurance Act (UI Act) and Unemployment Insurance Contributions Act 
(UICA).338 Including the Children’s Act of 2005 and the Immigration Act. Indeed some firms 
might opt to take the illegal route by employing illegal workers, perhaps as a means of saving 
costs.  
 
The position in South Africa is foreign employees enjoy the same protection under the 
LRA Act, regardless of their immigration or legal status.339 This was decided in Discovery Health 
Limited v CCMA & Others and it means that even if the employer wants to terminate employment 
it could be done in a procedurally fair manner. The case is still ongoing at the time of this research, 
this case shows why despite having laws, implementation and constant monitoring remains 
important.   
4.2.2 Relationships with trade unions 
   
South Africa has labour regulations and powerful trade unions that greatly influence and 
improve the quality of salary increment, improvement of working conditions among other 
things.340 The combination of these two elements makes  Salaries and wages are extremely difficult 
to adjust even in response to an economic situation.341 Furthermore, it is difficult to dismiss 
workers even if they are incompetent or unskilled the employer should provide training. The South 
African legislation also clearly set out rules for fair dismissal and if the employer does not follow 
the correct procedure the employer can be sued through CCMA.342   
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The relationship between trade unions and Chinese business firms in South Africa appears 
to be dynamic. For example, the ALRN research covered six Chinese companies in the Newcastle 
area, KwaZulu Natal in the chemicals, clothing and textile; and construction sector.343 Concluded 
that while unions were able to organise workers, the majority of companies were adopting ways 
of frustrating unions such as offering casual jobs instead of full-time jobs.344 limited collective 
bargaining, discrimination against local workers and lack of training programmes.345 This outcome 
can be as a result of the human rights lens applied by the authors as it failed to contextualise the 
behaviour in relation to the South African labour market. In more recent research, Huang Ren 
noted that there is a rapid development of non-traditional employment in South Africa,346 which 
is characterised by temporary or informal employment, making it difficult for trade unions to 
attract those workers which significantly decrease collective bargaining. 
 
To sum up, Chinese investments in South Africa are very important to the national 
economy. There is a certain degree of mistrust between the business managers, workers and trade 
unions. There is a need for more research on the factual impact of Chinese FDI on employment 
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5. TECHNOLOGY AND SKILLS TRANSFER IN CHINESE INVESTMENTS IN 
AFRICA.  
 
The second key concern is the issue of the lack of technology and skills transfer at Chinese 
firms in Africa. Perhaps, this criticism stems from the employment practices discussed above, 
since under FDI technology and skills are transferred through employment.  Therefore, practices 
such as importation of labour from China, casualisation of employment amongst others 
undermines the potential for skills and human resource development.347  
 
3.3.1 UNDERSTANDING TECHNOLOGY AND SKILLS TRANSFER  
 
In general, there is a lack of a common definition of what constitutes technology transfer.348 
As a result, there are various definitions349 thereof, however, this paper utilises New Zealand's 
definition as it is broader and wider enough to include some practices in the Africa-China 
engagement. This definition interprets it broadly :  
 
‘to include training, education and "know-how", along with any capital component. Four key modes 
of technology transfer are mentioned: (i) physical objects or equipment; (ii) skills and human aspects of 
technology management and learning; (iii) designs and blueprints which constitute the document-embodied 
knowledge on information and technology; and (iv) production arrangement linkages within which 
technology is operated.’350 
 
The difference defining what comprises the transfer of knowledge and technology can lead 
to a misunderstanding, possibly between developed countries and developing countries. Since 
under Art. 66 of the TRIPS agreement developed countries have a positive legal obligation to 
incentives to enterprises in order to promote and encourage transfer to LCDs.351 The significance 
of this provision is that out of the UN listed who are also WTO members 26 countries are African 
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countries.352 This includes eight SADC countries namely,  Angola, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,  Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.353 
 
This obligation is, however, only applicable to developed countries.354 It then becomes 
necessary to establish whether China is a developed or a developing country. The legal framework 
of the WTO has no specific definition of what a developing or a developed country is.355 According 
to Investopedia, China is not a developed country despite having the world's second-largest 
economy because its GDP remains below the ‘accepted standards of developed country status’.356 
However, this does not automatically drop China’s obligation or LCDs countries benefits under 
Art. 66,  because member States could challenge the decision of a member to make use of 
provisions available to developing countries. It, therefore, provides the African side with a strong 
case against Beijing. This is likely to provide a positive outcome given that in recent times China 
has affirmed its willingness to increase its contribution towards African building capacity, which 
includes human resources development and technological transfers.357  
 
Skills and technology transfers have received significant prioritisation in the FOCAC 
process. The Beijing Action plan (2013-2015) China reiterated its commitment and encouragement 
to knowledge sharing and transfer of what they referred to as ‘advanced and applicable 
technologies to African countries.’358 This highlights the desire to transfer both high-tech and low-
tech technology depending on the mode and channel of transfers. Therefore, it is likely that both 
private Chinese investments and SOEs investment will be required to ensure the substantive 
transfer of technology to the African countries in which they operate.  
Meaningful achievements have been attained to date, in terms of African human 
development. For example, to date, acting on the Johannesburg Action Plan (2016-2018) China 
has trained over 40 000 professionals from various industries.359 In addition, scholarships awarded 
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to African students to study in China increase from 2,000 annually in 2006 to 10000 in 2018.360 
This also includes the establishment of ‘China-Africa friendship schools, vocational education and 
training centres and capacity institutions.’361 Showing that indeed these Action Plans despite 
commonly using less authoritative language they are actually acted upon recently the FOCAC 
mechanism also involve follow up meetings that ensure the implementation of the Action Plans 
during the three-year period.  President Xi Jinping has recently applauded both Africa and China 
sides for implementing the Beijing Action Plan’s achievements which have brought benefits to 
both the people of Africa and China.362 This includes the commitment towards development such 
as the Belt and Road and Africa Agenda 2063.363 These initiatives offer an opportunity for more 
development for both sides since the Belt and Road initiative will result in employment creation 
and increased skills and technology transfer.  
 
From an institutional perspective, considerable progress is being done. However, there is 
an unclear picture of the actual impact on the ground. There is no African or Chinese database that 
captures the whereabouts of the beneficiaries of the education initiatives. It becomes fruitless for 
the Africa-China relationship if the beneficiaries and the graduates of education, skills and training 
initiatives are not available for recruitment by firms operating under the Chinese investments in 
Africa. 
 
However, research by Henry Tugendhat on Chinese courses for African officials which is 
primarily aimed at facilitating the transfer of technology, increase in trade opportunities and build 
a stronger political relationship.364 Discovered that the success rate was inconclusive, out of 29 
interviewees, 9 offered examples of how they applied the acquired knowledge in their work, 2 
were still in the testing phase, 18 failed to apply the knowledge directly while five were able to 
share knowledge informally to their colleagues.365 Lack of funding and resources or support by 
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the candidate’s host country likely contributed to the failure of these mostly, agriculture courses 
to have an impact on the broader society. 
  .    
3.3.2 TECHNOLOGY AND SKILLS TRANSFERS UNDER CHINESE 
INVESTMENT   
 
Pat Utomi submitted that in order to achieve growth and suitable development a strong 
investment must be made towards human capital development.366 This key area is greatly 
influenced by empowering the local human capital through, but not limited to, skill and technology 
transfer. Chinese enterprises operating in Africa have often been criticised for the lack of 
technology and skills transfers.367 Thereby, significantly impacting on the value creation and 
employment or continuity after the Chinese firms or projects have ended or closed down.368  
Literature and media reports have in the past recorded some of the negative reports against 
Chinese investments, for example:    
 
‘China’s so-called investments in Namibia bring very little, if any, skill and technology 
transfers, neither do such investments play a significant role in developing the country’s value 
addition and manufacturing base’ 369 
 
Similar sentiments are common in other African countries. In Zimbabwe, field research 
revealed that Chinese companies employed mostly unskilled or semi-skilled workers.370 
Consequently, there is hardly any skill or technological transfer, perhaps this can be contributed 
to the nature of the jobs that do not require much training.371 Given this wider perspective of the 
lack of skill and technology transfers, it is necessary to study if local workers receive any training, 
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Increasingly surveys on Chinese employment indicates an evolving practice in terms of 
training.372 In addition,  literature shows that Chinese firms are increasingly engaging in 
training.373 Dispelling the myths that are commonly perpetuated in reference to the topic under 
discussion.  There have been commendable efforts by Chinese companies in terms of providing 
training. For example, Huawei and ZTE have established a total of 10 training centres across Africa 
which according to the Chinese government trains over 20 000 African technicians annually.374 A 
2017 McKinsey report discovered that almost two-thirds of over a thousand Chinese companies 
they surveyed provided training to local employees.375 This, however, was predominantly in the 
construction and manufacturing sectors that require skilled workers.376 In some cases, some big 
Chinese firms sent workers to China for training. In Angola, SOAS researchers discovered Chinese 
firms had invested in vocational training centres which involved trips to Beijing to enhance 
workers’ related experience.377  Understanding the heterogeneous nature and the variation among 
Chinese firms is important in this regard for various reasons.378  
 
Some sectors are skill-intensive and thereby renders it necessary to give workers advanced 
training, while others require very little special skill.379 This also influences the levels of 
technological and skill transfers in each scenario,  the first case is likely to lead to more advanced 
skill development as opposed to the latter case which is likely to result in a limited transfer.380 The 
influencing factors are rather the nature of the particular work, rather than the willingness of the 
Chinese firms to train local workers. 
 
The next consideration must be the quality and effectiveness of the type of training 
provided for sustainable skill development. The form of training commonly offered by Chinese 
firms is on-site training.381 It can best be described as learning by doing and by observing.382  It 
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appears as if a form of blended learning varying between formal and informal training methods 
are applied. This, therefore, means in order to maximise effective skills and technology transfers 
policymakers must deliberately encourage investment in high tech sectors through for example, 
by providing incentives.  
 
3.3.3 OBSTACLES TO SKILLS AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS 
 
In general, there are numerous classifications of barriers that reduce the effectiveness of 
skill and technology transfers under FDI.383 Mock provided twenty-six barriers to technology 
transfers while putting a strong emphasis on barriers such as financial, competence, 
communication, and market-related barriers.384 In practice, Chinese investments in Africa are not 
immune to these barriers either,  which in most cases limits the maximisation of capitalising on 
the technology and skills transfer opportunities presented by these investments.  
 
 Tang discovered that despite Chinese firms offering training the outcome is not always 
satisfying.385 Since most African workers usually leave the company for other foreign companies 
after acquiring new skills from the training.386 In fact, SOAS research observed that workers were 
giving basic instructions only which resulted in little or zero skill transfer.387 This remained the 
case until the workers were considered to be reliable and trustworthy as this brings certainty to the 
management that the workers won't leave thereafter.388 This appears to be a determinant for 
additional quality training and promotion into more dynamic job positions that allow for 
substantive skill and technology transfer.389 The factors that contribute to such a practice are 
mostly financial constraints on the side of Chinese businesses which results in these firms, 
especially private companies,  paying lower wages. 390 This, however, deprives the Chinese 
 
383
 Adam Mazurkiewicz & Beata Poteralska  ‘Technology Transfer Barriers and Challenges Faced by 
R&D Organisations’  Procedia Engineering 182 ( 2017 ) 457 – 4 at     458. 
384
 Ibid.  
385




 Oya and Wanda op cit 281 at 49 
388
 Ibid.  
389
 Tang Xiaoyang op cit 37 at 116. 
390




companies off skilled workers in many African countries that have a limited pool of skilled 
labourers. 
  
Available research contains different scenarios. In 2006, Changjin, a Chinese firm in Egypt 
trained ninety local workers in china and immediately after completion, 80 percent of them left the 
company.391 Close to a decade later and in a different part of Africa, Oya noted that trainees often 
search for stable employment in Angolan civil service.392 This shows that there has been little 
progress on the issue of job shopping at Chinese firms which makes managers reluctant to invest 
in training local workers.  These negative perceptions about the quality of workers and their 
behaviour reflected common complaints by factory workers who are operating in the early phases 
of industrialisation.393 This trend is not unique to Chinese bosses or African workers.394 Even so, 
Chinese firms stand to benefit from increasing wages of skilled or trained workers so as to meet 
their genuine expectations of higher salaries thereby resulting in a more stable and productive 
workforce. 
 
Secondly, language barriers and communication problems between the Chinese managers 
and local African workers often results in misunderstandings.395 In various interviews, Chinese 
managers confirmed that most use informal mechanisms of training.396 This perhaps also relates 
to the nature of the on the job training commonly utilised by Chinese firms. According to Tang, 
most Chinese technicians are not fluent in English or any other common languages in Africa such 
as French, French, Arabic or Swahili.397 In many cases, African workers also can’t speak the 
aforementioned languages. He adds, that instead, they make use of interpreters to transit ideas, 
commands and instructions to local workers.398 The style of mechanically copying what the trainer 
does without having an underlying fundamental understating, results in the workers only being 
able to do what they saw, without stimulating innovation in the workers' expertise.  This rather 
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To reduce the damages caused by these barriers, the utilization of African management is 
required. Mr Zhang a businessman in Kenya stated “you should hire a local HR manager and avoid 
direct conflicts with the local employees. The local HR manager is more familiar with local 
employees and it’s easier for them to communicate to avoid misunderstanding and conflicts.” Even 
though this was in reference to protests it is applicable to the issue of skills transfers. Perhaps, 
there is a growing positive trend, Chinese companies are increasingly hiring more African 
managers however, there is still a room for improvement of local managerial employment.399 Even 
though there have been reports of discrimination against local managers in terms of status and 
wages in Zambia and Kenya.400 They are issues that can be rectified through dialogue with relevant 
stakeholders. Lastly, attention should be paid to the relationship between ‘skills’ and ‘technology’ 
transfer. The two concepts are intricately linked yet there is a possibility of African workers 
acquiring only one without the other. For example, through the aforesaid mechanical training 
methods, a worker can learn the skills on how to operate something without any technology being 
transferred. Conversely, machinery or equipment can be transferred to an African country without 
the necessary skills to repair and maintain it, as it wears out. 
 
3.3.4 A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE  
 
One of the methods to ensure skills and technology transfer is to use regulatory 
mechanisms most commonly through legislation. However, many African countries lack laws that 
render it mandatory for foreign companies to transfer skills and technology to their respective 
country and local workers.401 About the Namibia case which perhaps reflects the position of many 
countries in SADC and African in general, Mapure suggests that the area of skill and technology 
transfer is rather left to the host country’s ‘business craftiness’.402 This means that the African 
agency plays a major role through negotiations. In this case, any investment deals undertaken by 
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The lack of laws putting obligations on Chinese businesses to transfer skills and technology 
could be caused by the African government’s attempt to improve their investments so as not over-
regulate. African governments run the risk of not getting the benefits from the investments as since 
companies will be under no legal obligation to transfer knowledge and technology. This view was 
reflected by a Chinese reporter who argued that ‘It is unfair to say that China does not engage in 
the transfer of technology or skills if the laws of Namibia themselves do not provide a good 
environment for that to happen’.404 
 
The position is arguably true since the easier observation of skills and technology requires 
deliberate and considerable efforts by the recipients. This means that host countries are under 
obligations to invest in capacity building. Merely encouraging it does not surface.  
 
South Africa, a country more advanced, appears to have laws and mechanisms to ensure 
skills and technology transfers. While it does not specifically have provisions establishing 
obligations for skills transfers it has related legislation and measures aimed at acquiring the same 
results.  For example, the Skills Development Act, 1998 aims to ‘(a) to develop the skills of the 
South African workforce by (i)to improve the quality of life of workers, their prospects of work 
and labour mobility; (ii) to improve productivity in the workplace and the competitiveness of 
employers; (iii) to promote self-employment; and (iv) to improve the delivery of social services.’ 
405  
 
This is achieved by an institutional and financial framework which consist of various 
organisations and bodies such as the National Skills Act, Skills development centres etc.406 
Perhaps, this puts an obligation on Chinese firms to ensure that there are effective skills and 
technological transfers. This can be achieved through consistent monitoring to ensure businesses 
partake in the sectors they applied for. And that skills transfer takes place.  Aside from investment 
laws, governments may also make use of instruments such as tender requirements, work permits, 
labour laws and investment conditions can be used to achieve the desired outcomes.407 For 
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example, if a foreign professional wants to review an intracompany work permit in South Africa, 
immigration laws require the professional to provide proof of a plan for the transfer of skills to a 
South African citizen or permanent resident. 
Ultimately, it is, therefore, the duty of host African countries to establish effective legal 
frameworks through which skills and technology can be transferred.  Careful strategies must, 
however, be implemented so that they avoid the curse of an over-regulated investment 
environment.408 This includes making use of the FOCAC platform while it is not legally binding, 
they provide commitments which are likely to be achieved through political and economic 
influence.   
 
3.4 CASE STUDY: HUAWEI IN ZIMBABWE AND SOUTH AFRICA 
 
Huawei Technologies (Huawei) is one of China's leading global private 
telecommunications companies.409 The company moved into Africa and opened its first office in 
1998 in Kenya.410 It has expanded across the continent and has operations in forty African 
countries providing them with technology for smart city projects, research partnerships.411 To date, 
it has provided over fifty percent of African’s 4G network and is likely to receive major contracts 
to introduce 5G network to African economies.412 
 
Huawei operates in the Information and communication technologies (ICT) sector and 
therefore, presents an interesting case study for Africa-China skills and technology transfer.413 This 
because primarily Chinese investments were said to be mostly in extractive industries, this sector 
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3.5 Huawei in Zimbabwe  
 
Huawei started its operation around 1999 and Zimbabwe was one of the first countries in 
Africa it invested in.414 The ARLN research notes that Huawei is not registered as a company in 
Zimbabwe, but rather operates as an investor.415 In Addition, the report states that it is not obliged 
to pay taxes to the government, possibly because it does not generate income from its activities.416 
It, however, supplies telecommunication equipment to various service providers.  This section is 
rather limited to the training programmes offered by Huawei to ascertain technology and skills 
transfer. 
 
In Zimbabwe, when Huawei provides equipment to a local company, they offer the 
company training assistance on how to use and maintain the equipment.417 In also follow training 
methods commonly followed by Chinese companies such as seminars, workshops and on the job 
training.418 In 2001, in trained sixty-three engineers and technicians employees of TelOne, 
Zimbabwean SOEs, on how to operate the equipment while over 438  were trained locally.419  This 
shows that Huawei is committed to providing skills transfer through effective training of African 
workers. To date, thousands have since benefited from its universities in other African countries. 
The company also significantly contributes to technological advancement. 420   
 
4.2 Huawei in South Africa 
 
South Africa, one of the leading economies in Africa, is an important market for Huawei 
and other Chinese telecommunication companies.421 Huawei offers one of the most impressive 
socio-economic development efforts, through its training programmes.422 Field Research by June 
Sun of the China-Africa Research initiative discovered that technology transfers in the 
telecommunications sectors in respect of Huawei and Zhongxing Telecommunications Equipment 
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Corporation (ZTE). Three months of field research in South Africa identified increased managed 
services contracts, contestations for legitimacy, and weaknesses in the institutional framework as 
three main barriers towards significant technology transfer in the sector. 423  
 
The first barrier identified was in the area of managed services and vendor financing.  In 
this case, technology transfer from vendors to operators are limited with the increase in managed 
services contracts.424 This is because, under this arrangement equipment sales, maintenance and 
service are generally outsourced back to vendors thereby limiting the working relationship 
between engineers from both sides.425 In this case, the vendors would be Huawei and the operators 
would be companies such as Vodacom, Cell C, Telkom and MTN.426 
 
Secondly, there was an issue of legitimacy fuelled by cultural difference, this had an impact 
on the transfer of technology transfer from vendors to operators.427 In addition, Interviewees 
expressed the difference in cultural and language barriers between the two sides, besides Huawei 
employing approximately 60 percent of local workers.428 Not surprisingly, these concerns are very 
common among Chinese firms operating in Africa. These barriers damage the brands' reputation, 
same some assume that Chinese equipment is of poor quality.429  The research observed that 
Huawei attempted to lessen the damages by employing locals in their training centres.430 Its impact 
vendor-operator relationship in South African consequently, delayed technology transfer. 
 
Lastly, weakness in South African’s institutional framework hindered technology transfer. 
The research recorded that despite South African’s desire to have a commitment to technology 
transfer from Chinese firms, there is a lack of enforcement of regulations for local content.431 
While Huawei complies with BBBEE requirements, it was noted that it doesn’t necessarily involve 
transformative change. In addition, the country’s education system has been criticised as it does 
not produce candidates with sufficient capabilities or skill set to absorb necessary skills.432  
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This demonstrates that while there has been significant progress in terms of projects and 
willingness to train and transfer skills and knowledge. There are various barriers that require 
serious attention by both the host governments and Chinese businesses, and in addition, Perhaps, 
Beijing itself as it can impact either negatively or positively on its image. 
 
5. CONCLUSION  
 
To sum up, it is beyond media reports, myths or stereotypes that Chinese investments in 
Africa create important employment for local African workers.  However, the management of this 
employment is not without discrepancies on all levels, that is firm-level, national and regional 
level. The discussion above noted that while challenges are present, over time, significant progress 
has been made. Some Chinese enterprises have responded positively to complaints and 
discrimination on issues of labour relations and skills and technology transfers. Equally African 
and the Chinese government have made significant institutional, policy and legislative 
advancement in response to challenges faced by Chinese investment in Africa. However, the 
impact of these legal mechanisms and the progress made by Chinese firms in Africa is somewhat 
different. This is because there are different policies and practices on managing Chinese 
investment in Africa as highlighted by the two case studies. The next chapter provides a conclusion 
























Chinese Investment Africa has drastically increased over the last two decades and it continues to 
expand. China’s economic activities in Africa have somewhat challenged the position of 
continent’s traditional investors such as the UK, USA, France, Canada and many more European 
countries. China as an alternative source of finance for African development breaks the 
dependency that Africa had on its former colonial masters. The severance of colonial ties meant 
Africa had to learn ways of managing foreign investments with Chinese characteristics. In so 
doing, strong debates arose, with China accused of neo-colonialism, debt trap, mistreating of 
African workers, lack of skills and technology transfers, importing Chinese labour for projects in 
Africa, the list is endless. However, literature has shown that many accusations are myths. We 
must, therefore, distinguish between stereotypes and factual problems.   
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to consolidate the research conducted in the preceding 
chapters. In assessing the impact of Chinese investment in Africa on labour relations; skills and 
technology transfers in SADC with the aim of maximising the benefits of Chinese investments in 
Africa. It was important to identify the challenges detrimental to the success of Chinese 
investments in Africa while offering pragmatic possible remedies. This section also offers 
recommendations for the future. 
 
 
4.1.1. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
a)  Chapter 1: Introduction  
   This chapter introduced the research topic of ‘Chinese investments in Africa: Addressing 
and Analysing the challenges.’ The chapter further investigated the background of the problem. It 
further provided for the research methodology. Africa is in dire need of development and 




not been effective in assisting African countries to reach their desired goals.  The emergence of 
China as an alternative source of financial and technical assistance offered optimism amongst 
African political elites who were constantly pressured by the aid conditions from the west. Equally 
so, the scepticism amongst some African citizens and the west. The issues encountered were 
myriad, ranging from unscrupulous labour practices and lack of beneficiation of the host country.   
In an attempt to address the problem, research questions were identified under chapter 1.4 
with the main research question being, ‘How best can the African States maximise economic 
benefits and manage the impact of Chinese Investments in Africa?’ succeeded by the sub-
questions. 
I. What mechanisms, if any, has the African States put in place in 
trying to minimise the risk involved with Chinese investments in Africa, including 
at a National, Regional and Continental level?   
II. What are the challenges encountered under Chinese Investments in 
African in addressing development goals in SADC?   
b)  Chapter 2: Literature review and legal-policy framework for Chinese investments 
in Africa 
This chapter dealt with the first sub-question on what mechanisms has the African States 
put in place in trying to minimise the risk involved with Chinese investments in Africa. The 
complexity of the regulatory systems of China coupled with the lack of transparency of African 
governance meant that it is often difficult to understand institutions and the legal mechanism used 
to manage these investments. 
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate the current state of current literature on the 
area of Chinese investments. In addition, economic theories of development were also unpacked 
and addressed and used to study the beneficiation of Chinese investments.    It also illustrated the 
legal and policy mechanism through which the investment is processed.   
This study notes that legal and institutional mechanisms are active, and they should thus 
make use of them. That is their domestic legal systems effectively enforced can increase 
compliance and benefits of Chinese FDI. The FOCAC also stands as a primary and most important 
platform through which African and Chinese governments can reduce risks associated with the 
investments. Perhaps, maximise the benefits, however, the African voice must be amplified in the 
action points because presently, this study discovered that it is rather neutral in comparison to the 




c)  Chapter 3: Challenges and prospects of Chinese investments in Africa  
  
This chapter dealt with the second ancillary research question where the core challenges 
faced under Chinese investments are considered. The problems identified are Labour relations and 
Skills and technological transfers as they are encountered across all sectors of possible 
investments, furthermore, they are the two most commonly used facts used to argue against the 
investments as not beneficial.  
The main focus of this chapter is to provide evidence for Chinese business practices, 
predominantly countries in the SADC while considering other countries with robust Chinese 
activities such as Ethiopia. This research notes that the activities are different in nature, some 
positive and some negative. Companies have improved their labour relations with the workers, 
governments and trade unions. Significant progress has been registered by many companies in 
terms of offering effective training and skills transfer. However, this progress is not sufficient.  
From the look of things, while there are generally improvements, it would be desirable for African 
governments to make use of the available legal mechanism. An improvement on the enforcement 
of national laws, an increase of commitments towards technological transfers in the FOCAC action 
plans, promulgation of minimum wages would minimise the risk associated with Chinese 
investments in Africa. And once this corridor of investments rectifies these issues, it means, there 
is no negative publicity from the world, it means that they attract educated workers, this, in turn, 
improves not only the development of the African continent but it increases the revenue of the 
















4.2 RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
As illustrated from the above analysis, Chinese investments in Africa is arguably a 
significant factor in economic development in Africa. It provides technological advancement, 
skills development, employment creation, human resources development for Africa. However, 
there is a need to develop an investment regulatory system, in order to maximise the benefits from 
this chain of investments. Adequate laws and effective policies and indeed enforcement and 
implementation of thereof is required to bring about the effectiveness of the said investment 
regulatory system.433 So, based on the conclusion reached, legal and businesses practitioners, 
government officials and other interested parties should consider the following summary of 
recommendations that can be used as strategies to develop a successful investment regulatory 
framework for Chinese investments in Africa.  
  
I. It is my humble submission that a ‘China policy’ is not only 
important but necessary. China has a comprehensive Africa policy which is 
constantly updated according to its own development goals however, Africa is still 
to develop one. Africa should develop its own China policy which will detail its 
strategy and negotiations approaches with the Chinese. This should be centred 
around the African Union’s Agenda 2063, so as to ensure Chinese investments 
contribute towards reaching those goals.434 
 
II. The FOCAC platform as a premier platform through which 
investments are initiated between China and Africa.  African countries should have 
a common position. This is because while the FOCAC commitments are 
pronounced multi-laterally actual investment are negotiated bilaterally. If there is a 
lack of common purpose, some African countries must compromise or may have 
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III. Skills development and skills and technological transfers are 
important. Although the findings above indicate that Chinese companies employ 
local workers, they offer training. Complaints are constantly being heard by 
workers across the continent and some civil society groups. In order to reduce the 
dependence on the ignorance of the law, the Mozambique government translated 
the country’s labour laws into mandarin and the results were positive in terms of 
compliance.435 This pragmatic and cost-effective approach can be imitated by other 
African countries.  
IV. The language barrier is a problem across the continent in Africa-
china relations. Indeed, an impediment towards effective skills development, skills 
and technological transfers. To address this matter, there should be more language 
training centres for both African and Chinese officials. Furthermore, African 
graduates with Chinese qualifications and the beneficiaries of the FOCAC cultural 
exchange education programmes should be lured to work in government and 
businesses under the Chinese investments in African.  
V. Developing leniency policies at the national level so as to incentivise 
companies that complies with the countries respective national laws. Africa should 
consider copying China’s social credit system. 
VI. A multi-layered Monitoring and Evaluation plan jointly coordinated 
by Africa and China that provides for stakeholder input with periodic reporting and 
relatively unrestricted public access to the reports.436 
VII. Strengthen policy, legal and institutional oversight for effective 
management of social-economic impacts associated Chinese investments in Africa 
across all sectors.    
VIII. African states could also consider harmonising their investments 
laws. This can take a piecemeal approach. For example, members could start off by 
harmonising performance requirements and certain aspects of labour relations, to 
the extent that it does not interfere with their sovereignty. 
IX. African monitoring departments should be sufficiently staffed with 
educated and trained personnel, the leaders and staff should not be corrupt and 
appropriate channels should be provided.  
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X. African countries should consider adopting  China's forced transfer 
of skills and technology transfer and encourage more joint ventures to stimulate 
Africa’s entrepreneurial drive.  
 
4.3 FINAL CONCLUSION 
Selected Africa-China investment challenges were addressed and analysed in this research 
paper. That is, labour relations matters such as low wages, relations with trade unions and 
employment of local labour as well as skills development and technology transfers are not unique 
to Africa and are experience in other developing countries.   
 
As regards to labour relations, broadly translated our findings indicate that Chinese 
companies employ more Africans than Chinese ex-pat levels, however, the majority still make use 
of Chinese management in this area there is a room for improvement. Secondly, businesses 
generally have good relations with trade unions, especially in countries with stronger unions, our 
findings, however, indicated that they generally prefer internal consultations as opposed to having 
trade unions nevertheless there is a promising trend of cooperation. Thirdly, there is an indication 
that most Chinese firms generally have lower wages than other foreign investors, however, they 
differ on a firm-level and according to the job positions. 
 
As regards to skills and technology transfer, our findings indicated that Chinese companies 
generally offer training, and skills, since it is desirable to have skilled workers in order to increase 
production. However, there are significant barriers that limit these efforts. In addition, there is a 
lack of legislation in many African countries requiring the transfer of technology and where there 
are policies authorities are reluctant to enforce the provisions, there appears to be a lack of political 
will if not fear. It must be noted that Africa needs Chinese investments in order to reduce the 
infrastructural gap, industrialisation as well as employment creation and technological transfer. 
Considering the progress made under Chinese investments in Africa it is imperative that this field 
is given more attention. It does, however, have limitations and Africa cannot exclusively rely on 
one partner. Traditional western investors play an important role. Therefore, there is a need to 
attract investments from all global powers. On the basis of this reality, there is, therefore, a need 
for future studies that can develop a uniform investment framework that can attract investment 
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